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Abstract
Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design,
and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian
mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings. However, most existing studies
do not consider the complexity for the seller to carry out the mechanism. It is assumed that the
seller knows “each single bit” of the distributions and is able to optimize perfectly based on the
entire distributions. Unfortunately this is a strong assumption and may not hold in reality: for
example, when the value distributions have exponentially large supports or do not have succinct
representations.
In this work we consider, for the first time, the query complexity of Bayesian mechanisms.
We only allow the seller to have limited oracle accesses to the players’ value distributions, via
quantile queries and value queries. For a large class of auction settings, we prove logarithmic
lower-bounds for the query complexity for any DSIC Bayesian mechanism to be of any constant
approximation to the optimal revenue. For single-item auctions and multi-item auctions with
unit-demand or additive valuation functions, we prove tight upper-bounds via efficient query
schemes, without requiring the distributions to be regular or have monotone hazard rate. Thus,
in those auction settings the seller needs to access much less than the full distributions in order
to achieve approximately optimal revenue.
Keywords: mechanism design, the complexity of Bayesian mechanisms, query complexity,
quantile queries, value queries
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1 Introduction
An important problem in Bayesian mechanism design is to design auctions that (approximately)
maximize the seller’s expected revenue. More precisely, in a Bayesian multi-item auction a seller
has m heterogenous items to sell to n players. Each player i has a private value for each item j, vij ;
and each vij is independently drawn from some prior distribution Dij . When the prior distribution
D , ×ijDij is of common knowledge to both the seller and the players, optimal Bayesian incentive-
compatible (BIC) mechanisms have been discovered for various auction settings [31, 16, 7, 8], where
all players reporting their true values forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. When there is no common
prior but the seller knows D, many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
(DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been designed [31, 32, 12, 29, 35, 9], where it is each player’s
dominant strategy to report his true values.
However, the complexity for the seller to carry out such mechanisms is largely unconsidered in
the literature. Most existing Bayesian mechanisms require that the seller has full access to the prior
distribution D and is able to carry out all required optimizations based on D, so as to compute
the allocation and the prices. Unfortunately the seller may not be so knowledgeable or powerful in
real-world scenarios. If the supports of the distributions are exponentially large (in m and n), or if
the distributions are continuous and do not have succinct representations, it is hard for the seller
to write out “each single bit” of the distributions or precisely carry out arbitrary optimization tasks
based on them. Even with a single player and a single item, when the value distribution is irregular,
computing the optimal price in time that is much smaller than the size of the support is not an easy
task. Thus, a natural and important question to ask is how much the seller should know about the
distributions in order to obtain approximately optimal revenue.
In this work we consider, for the first time, the query complexity of Bayesian mechanisms. In
particular, the seller can only access the distributions by making oracle queries. Two natural types
of queries are allowed, quantile queries and value queries. That is, the seller queries the oracle with
specific quantiles (respectively, values), and the oracle returns the corresponding values (respectively,
quantiles) in the underlying distributions. These two types of queries happen a lot in market study.
Indeed, the seller may wish to know what is the price he should set so that half of the consumers
would purchase his product; or if he sets the price to be 200 dollars, how many consumers would
buy it. Another important scenario where such queries naturally come up is in databases. Indeed,
although the seller may not know the distribution, some powerful institutes, say the Office for
National Statistics, may have such information figured out and stored in its database. As in most
database applications, it may be neither necessary nor feasible for the seller to download the whole
distribution to his local machines. Rather, he would like to access the distribution via queries to
the database. Other types of queries are of course possible, and will be considered in future works.
In this work we focus on non-adaptive queries. That is, the seller makes all oracle queries
simultaneously, before the auction starts. This is also natural in both database and market study
scenarios, and adaptive queries will be considered in future works. Due to lack of space, most proofs
are provided in the appendix.
1.1 Main Results
We would like to understand both lower- and upper-bounds for the query complexity of approxi-
mately optimal Bayesian auctions. In this work, we mainly consider three widely studied settings:
single-item auctions and multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions. Our
main results are summarized in Table 1.
Note that we allow arbitrary unbounded distributions that satisfy small-tail assumptions, with
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formal definitions provided in Section 5.1. Similar assumptions are widely adopted in sampling
mechanisms [33, 18], to deal with irregular distributions with unbounded supports. Since distri-
butions with bounded supports automatically satisfy the small-tail assumptions, the lower-bounds
listed for the former apply to the latter as well.
Auctions
Distributions
Bounded in [1,H] Unbounded & Small Tail
Single-Item Θ(nǫ−1 logH) O(−nǫ−1 log h( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ) )
Unit-Demand
∀c > 1: Ω(mn logHlog c )
∀c > 24: O(mn logHlog(c/24))
∀c > 24:
O(−n log h(
2c−48
3c
)
log(c/24) )
Additive
∀c > 1: Ω(mn logHlog c )
∀c > 8: O(mn logHlog(c/8) )
∀c > 8:
O(−m2n log h(
c−8
10c
)
log(c/8) )
Single-Item Regular Distributions: Ω(nǫ−1), O(nǫ−1 log nǫ )
Table 1: Our main results. Here h(·) < 1 is the tail function in the small-tail assumptions. For
single-item auctions, the revenue is a (1 + ǫ)-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue, with ǫ
sufficiently small. For multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions, the
revenue is a c-approximation for some constant c.
Also note that our lower- and upper-bounds on query complexity are tight for bounded distri-
butions. As will become clear in Section 3 and Appendix A, our lower-bounds allow the seller to
make both value and quantile queries, and apply to any multi-player multi-item auctions where
each player’s valuation function is succinct sub-additive: formal definitions in Appendix A. The
lower-bounds also allow randomized queries and randomized mechanisms.
For the upper-bounds, all our query schemes are deterministic and only make one type of queries:
value queries for bounded distributions and quantile queries in the other cases; see Sections 4 and
5. We show that our schemes, despite of being very efficient, only loses a small fraction of revenue
compared with when the seller has full access to the distributions.
1.2 Discussions
Sample Complexity. A closely related area to our work is sampling mechanisms [15, 3, 28,
19, 30, 18, 21, 22, 6]. It assumes that the seller does not know D but observes independent samples
from D before the auction begins. The sample complexity measures how many samples the seller
needs so as to obtain a good approximation to the optimal Bayesian revenue. The best-known
sample complexity results are summarized in Table 2.
Oracle queries can be seen as targeted samples, where the seller actively asks the information
he needs rather than passively learns about it from random samples. As such, it is intuitive that
queries are more efficient than samples, but it is a priori unclear how efficient queries can be. Our
results answer this question quantitatively and show that query complexity can be exponentially
smaller than sample complexity: the former is logarithmic in the “size” of the distributions, while
the latter is polynomial.
Finally, the design of query mechanisms facilitates the design of sampling mechanisms. If the
seller observes enough samples from D, then he can mimic quantile queries and apply query mech-
anisms: see Appendix E for more details.
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Auctions
Single-Item
(regular) [18]
Single-Item
(bounded) [18]
Unit-Demand
(bounded) [30]
Additive
(bounded)[6]
Sample
Complexity
O˜(nǫ−4) O˜(nHǫ−3) O˜(nm2H2ǫ−2) O˜(nm2H2ǫ−2)
Approximations 1 + ǫ 1 + ǫ 27 32
Table 2: Sample Complexity. When a distribution is bounded, it is bounded within [1,H]. For
multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions, the revenue has an extra ǫ
additive loss.
Parametric Auctions. Parametric mechanisms [2, 1] assume the seller only knows some
specific parameters about the distributions, such as the mean, the median (or a single quantile),
and the variance. Note that using quantile or value queries, one can get the exact value of the
median and the approximate value of the mean, and then apply parametric mechanisms. However,
existing parametric mechanisms only consider single-parameter auctions, where the distributions
are regular or have monotone hazard rate. Since our mechanisms make non-adaptive oracle queries,
our results imply parametric mechanisms in multi-parameter settings with general distributions,
where the “parameters” are the oracle’s answers to our query schemes. Our lower-bounds imply
that knowing only the median is not enough to achieve the same approximation ratios as we do.
Finally, it remains unknown whether constant approximations can be achieved for multi-parameter
auctions or general distributions, knowing only the mean and the variance.
Distributions within Bounded Distance. Recently, [6] studies auctions where the true
prior distribution is unknown to the seller, but he is given a distribution that is close to the true
prior, as measured by the Kolmogorov distance. On the one hand, the learnt distributions from
our query schemes can be far from the true prior in terms of the Kolmogorov distance, thus their
mechanisms do not apply. On the other hand, although a distribution close to the true prior may
be learnt via sufficiently many oracle queries, our lower-bounds imply that the query complexity of
this approach will not be better than ours.
Using Experts as Oracles. If the players’ value distributions are known by some experts,
then the seller can use the experts as oracles. Indeed, we are able to design proper scoring rules
[5, 11] for the seller to elicit truthful answers from the experts for his queries. If the experts are
actually players in the auctions, then they have their own stakes about the final allocation and
prices, and it would be interesting to see how the seller can still use them as oracles and get truthful
answers for his queries, while keeping them truthful about their own values. See [14] for more
discussions on this front.
1.3 Other Related Works
The complexity of auctions is an important topic in the literature, and several complexity measures
have been considered. Following the taxation principle [24, 23], [26] defines the menu complexity
of truthful auctions. For a single additive buyer, [17] shows the optimal Bayesian auction for
revenue can have an infinite menu size or a continuum of menu entries, and [4] shows a constant
approximation under finite menu complexity. Recently, [20] considers the taxation, communication,
query and menu complexities of truthful combinatorial auctions, and shows important connections
among them. The queries considered there are totally different from ours: we are concerned with the
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complexity of accessing the players’ value distributions in Bayesian settings, while [20] is concerned
with the complexity of accessing the players’ valuation functions in non-Bayesian settings.
1.4 Future Directions
Many interesting questions about the query complexity of Bayesian auctions are worth exploring.
First, as mentioned, we focus on non-adaptive queries in this work. One can imagine more powerful
mechanisms using adaptive queries, where the seller’s later queries depend on the oracle’s responses
to former ones. It is intriguing to design approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms with lower
query complexity using adaptive queries, or prove that even with such queries, the query complexity
cannot be much better than our lower-bounds. Another interesting direction is when the answers
of the oracle contain noise. In this case, the distributions learnt by the seller may be within a small
distance from the “true distributions” defined by oracle answers without noise. This is related to [6]
and it would be interesting to design mechanisms to handle such noise.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bayesian Auctions
In a multi-item auction there are m items, denoted by M = {1, . . . ,m}, and n players, denoted
by N = {1, . . . , n}. Each player i ∈ N has a non-negative value for each item j ∈ M , vij ,
which is independently drawn from distribution Dij . Player i’s true valuation is (vij)j∈[m]. To
simplify the notations, we may write vi for (vij)j∈[m] and v for (vi)i∈[n]. Letting Di = ×j∈MDij and
D = ×i∈NDi, we use I = (N,M,D) to denote the corresponding Bayesian auction instance and
OPT (I) the optimal BIC revenue of I . When I is clear from the context, we write OPT for short.
We will consider several classes of widely studied auctions. A single-item auction has m = 1.
When m > 1, a bidder i being unit-demand means his value for a subset S of items is maxj∈S vij ,
and a bidder i being additive means his value for S is
∑
j∈S vij . When all bidders are unit-demand
(respectively, additive), we call such an auction a unit-demand auction (respectively, an additive
auction) for short.
2.2 Query Complexity
In this work, we only allow the seller to access the prior distributions via two types of oracle queries:
value queries and quantile queries. Given a distribution D over reals, in a value query, the seller
sends a value v ∈ R and the oracle returns the corresponding quantile q(v) , Prx∼D[x ≥ v]. In a
quantile query, the seller sends a quantile q ∈ [0, 1] and the oracle returns the corresponding value
v(q) such that Prx∼D[x ≥ v(q)] = q. With non-adaptive queries, the seller first sends all his queries
to the oracle, gets the answers back, and then runs the auction. The query complexity is the number
of queries made by the seller.
Note that the answer to a value query is unique. The quantile queries are a bit tricky, as
for discrete distributions there may be multiple values corresponding to the same quantile q, or
there may be none. When there are multiple values, to resolve the ambiguity, let the output
of the oracle be the largest one: that is, v(q) = argmaxz{Prx∼D[x ≥ z] = q}. When there is
no value corresponding to q, the oracle returns the largest value whose corresponding quantile
is larger than q: that is, v(q) = argmaxz{Prx∼D[x ≥ z] > q}. So for any quantile query q,
v(q) = argmaxz{Prx∼D[x ≥ z] ≥ q} in general. For any discrete distribution D and quantile query
q > 0, v(q) is always in the support of D. When q = 0, v(q) may be +∞.
4
3 Lower Bounds
In this section, we prove lower bounds for the query complexity of Bayesian mechanisms, and we
focus on DSIC mechanisms. As a building block for our general lower bound, we first have the
following for single-item single-player auctions, proved in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1. For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for any large enough H,
any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M making less than C logcH (randomized) non-adaptive value and
quantile queries to the oracle, there exists a single-player single-item Bayesian auction instance
I = (N,M,D) where the values are bounded in [1,H], such that Rev(M(I)) < OPT (I)c .
We extend this lemma to arbitrary multi-player multi-item Bayesian auctions with succinct sub-
additive valuations, as follows, with the corresponding definitions and the proof of the theorem
deferred to Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1. For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for any n ≥ 1,m ≥ 1,
any large enough H, any succinct sub-additive valuation function profile v = (vi)i∈[n], and any DSIC
Bayesian mechanismM making less than Cnm logcH non-adaptive value and quantile queries to the
oracle, there exists a multi-item Bayesian auction instance I = (N,M,D) with valuation profile v,
where |N | = n, |M | = m and the item values are bounded in [1,H], such that Rev(M(I)) < OPT (I)c .
Succinct sub-additive valuations is a very broad class and contains single-item, unit-demand,
and additive auctions as special cases. Thus Theorem 1 automatically applies to those cases. We
also note that it is shown in [36] that the optimal BIC revenue exceeds the optimal DSIC revenue by
a constant factor even for two i.i.d. additive bidders and two identical items. So even with infinite
samples, there exist constants c > 1 such that no c-approximation to OPT is possible. However,
Theorem 1 is stronger: for every constant c > 1, one needs at least the given number of queries to
get a c-approximation.
4 The Query Complexity for Bounded Distributions
In this section, we consider settings where all distributions are bounded within [1,H], and we con-
struct efficient query mechanisms whose query complexity matches our lower-bounds. We show that
it is sufficient to use only value queries, and we define in Section 4.1 a universal query scheme AV ,
which will be used as a black-box in our mechanisms. The seller uses algorithm AV to learn a
distribution D′ = ×i∈N,j∈MD′ij that approximates the prior distribution D and is stochastically
dominated by D. The seller then runs existing DSIC Bayesian mechanisms using D′, while the
players’ values are drawn from D. In this sense, all our mechanisms are simple, but they are not
given a true Bayesian instance as input.
The multi-player single-item setting is already non-trivial, but still easy, since we have a good
understanding of the optimal mechanism, which is Myerson’s auction [31]. In particular, in the
analysis it suffices to apply the revenue monotonicity theorem of [18]. The situation for unit-
demand auctions and additive auctions is much more subtle. The optimal auction could be very
complicated and may involve lotteries and bundling, and revenue monotonicity may not hold [27].
Even (disregarding complexity issues and) assuming we can design an optimal Bayesian mechanism
for D′, it is unclear how much revenue it guarantees when the players’ values come from the true
distribution D. To overcome this difficulty, we rely on recent developments on simple Bayesian
mechanisms with approximately optimal revenue.
The mechanism for unit-demand auctions is sequential post-price [29] and the analysis is rela-
tively easy. For additive auctions, the Bayesian mechanism either runs Myerson’s auction separately
for each item or runs the VCG mechanism with a per-player entry fee [35, 9]. However, an easy and
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direct analysis would lose a factor of m in the query complexity. To achieve a tight upper-bound,
we need to really open the box and analyze the mechanism differently in several crucial places,
exploring its behavior under oracle queries.
To sum up, given our query scheme, our mechanisms are black-box reductions to simple Bayesian
mechanisms, thus are simple, natural, and easy to implement in practice, while the analysis is non-
black-box, non-trivial and reveals interesting connections between Bayesian mechanisms and query
schemes.
4.1 The Value-Query Algorithm
The query algorithm AV is defined in Algorithm 1. Here D ∈ ∆(R) is the distribution to be
queried. The algorithm takes two parameters, the value bound H and the precision factor δ > 0,
makes O(log1+δH) value queries to the oracle, and then returns a discrete distribution D
′. It is
easy to verify that D′ is stochastically dominated by D. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the
mean of D′ approximates that of D. Indeed, mean(D) =
∫ H
1 vdF (v) ≤
∑k−1
l=0 vl+1Pr[vl ≤ v <
vl+1] + vkD(vk) ≤ (1 + δ)
∑k
l=0 vlD
′(vl) = (1 + δ)mean(D
′). Therefore, by directly applying the
parametric mechanism in [1] with parameter mean(D′) (for single-parameter auctions where the
distributions are regular or MHR), we will get at least a (1 + δ) fraction of their revenue.
Algorithm 1 The Value-Query Algorithm AV
Input: The value bound H and the precision factor δ.
1: Let k = ⌈log1+δH⌉ and define the value vector as v = (v0, v1, . . . , vk−1, vk) = (1, (1 + δ), (1 +
δ)2, . . . , (1 + δ)k−1,H).
2: Query the oracle for D with v, and receive a non-increasing quantile vector q =
(q(v0), · · · , q(vk)) = (ql)l∈{0,...,k}. Note q0 = 1.
3: Construct a discrete distribution D′ as follows: D′(vl) = ql − ql+1 for any l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where
qk+1 , 0.
Output: Distribution D′.
4.2 Single-Item Auctions and Unit-Demand Auctions
Denoting by MMRS Myerson’s mechanism for single-item auctions, Mechanism 2 defines our effi-
cient value Myerson mechanism MEVM .
Mechanism 2 Efficient Value Myerson Mechanism MEVM
1: Given the value bound H and a constant ǫ > 0, run the value-query algorithm AV with H
and δ = ǫ for each player i’s distribution Di. Denote by D′i the returned distribution. Let
D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
2: RunMMRS with D′ and the players’ reported values, b = (bi)i∈N , to get allocation x = (xi)i∈N
and price profile p = (pi)i∈N as the outcome.
The query complexity ofMEVM is O(n log1+ǫH), since each distribution Di needs O(log1+ǫH)
value queries in AV . When ǫ is sufficiently small, O(n log1+ǫH) ≈ O(nǫ−1 logH). Also, MEVM is
DSIC since MMRS is so.
In this section and throughout the paper, we often analyze “mismatching” cases where a Bayesian
mechanism M uses distribution D′ while the actual Bayesian instance is I = (N,M,D) (i.e., the
players’ true values are drawn from D). We use Rev(M(I;D′)) to denote the expected revenue in
this case. By construction, Rev(MEVM (I)) = Rev(MMRS(I;D′)).
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Because the distribution D′ constructed in MEVM is stochastically dominated by D, let-
ting I ′ = (N,M,D′) be the Bayesian instance under D′, by revenue monotonicity [18] we have
Rev(MMRS(I;D′)) ≥ Rev(MMRS(I ′)). By Lemma 5 of [18], Rev(MMRS(I ′)) ≥ OPT (I)1+ǫ . Thus
we have the following simple result.
Theorem 2. ∀ǫ > 0, for any single-item instance I = (N,M,D) with values in [1,H], mechanism
MEVM is DSIC, has query complexity O(n log1+ǫH), and Rev(MEVM (I)) ≥ OPT (I)1+ǫ .
The construction for unit-demand auctions is similar, except the seller uses as a blackbox the
DSIC mechanism of [29], denoted by MUD: see Mechanism 3.
Mechanism 3 Mechanism MEV UD for Unit-Demand Auctions
1: Given H and ǫ > 0, run the value-query algorithm AV with H and δ = ǫ for each player i’s
distribution Dij for each item j. Denote by D′ij the returned distribution. Let D′i = ×j∈MD′ij
and D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
2: Run MUD with D′ and the players’ reported values, b = (bij)i∈N,j∈M , to get allocation x =
(xij)i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (pi)i∈N as the outcome.
The main difficulty for unit-demand auctions is that we no longer have revenue monotonicity as
in single-item auctions. Our analysis then comes in a non-blackbox way and relies on the COPIES
setting [12, 29], which provides an upper-bound for the optimal BIC revenue. By properly upper-
bounding the optimal revenue in the COPIES setting under D′, we are able to upper-bound the
optimal revenue in unit-demand auctions using the expected revenue of MEV UD. More precisely,
we have the following theorem, proved in Appendix B.1.
Theorem 3. ∀ǫ > 0, for any unit-demand instance I = (N,M,D) with values in [1,H], mechanism
MEV UD is DSIC, has query complexity O(mn log1+ǫH), and Rev(MEV UD(I)) ≥ OPT (I)24(1+ǫ) .
Letting c = 24(1 + ǫ), we have the query complexity in Table 1.
4.3 Additive Auctions
For additive auctions, the DSIC Bayesian mechanism in [35, 9] chooses between two mechanisms,
whichever generates higher expected revenue under the true prior D. The first is the “individual My-
erson” mechanism, denoted by MIM , which sells each item separately using Myerson’s mechanism.
The second is the VCG mechanism with optimal per-player entry fees, denoted by MBV CG.
In our mechanism MEV A, the seller queries about D using algorithm AV with properly chosen
parameters. Given the resulting distribution D′, the seller either runs MIM or runs MBV CG as
a blackbox, resulting in query mechanisms MEV IM and MEV BV CG. We only define the latter in
Mechanism 4, and the former simply replaces MBV CG with MIM . Note that Rev(MEV IM (I)) =
Rev(MIM (I;D′)) and Rev(MEV BV CG(I)) = Rev(MBV CG(I;D′)). However, the seller cannot
compute these two revenue and choose the better one, because he does not know D. Thus he
randomly chooses between the two, according to probabilities defined in our analysis, to optimize
the approximation ratio. We have the following theorem, proved in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 4. ∀ǫ > 0, for any additive instance I = (N,M,D) with values in [1,H], mechanism
MEV A is DSIC, has query complexity O(mn log1+ǫH), and Rev(MEV A(I)) ≥ OPT (I)8(1+ǫ) .
Theorem 4 is harder to show. Indeed, one cannot use revenue monotonicity or the COPIES
setting to easily upper-bound the optimal BIC revenue. Our analysis is based on the duality
framework of [9] for Bayesian auctions, properly adapted for the query setting. Finally, letting
c = 8(1 + ǫ), we have the query complexity in Table 1.
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Mechanism 4 Mechanism MEV BV CG to Approximate MBV CG via Value Queries
1: Given H and ǫ > 0, run the value-query algorithm AV with H and δ =
√
ǫ+ 1 − 1 for each
player i’s distribution Dij for each item j. Denote by D′ij the returned distribution. Let
D′i = ×j∈MD′ij and D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
2: Run MBV CG with D′ and the players’ reported values, b = (bij)i∈N,j∈M , to get allocation
x = (xij)i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (pi)i∈N as the outcome.
5 The Query Complexity for Unbounded Distributions
Next, we construct efficient query mechanisms for arbitrary distributions whose supports can be un-
bounded. For a mechanism to approximate the optimal Bayesian revenue using finite non-adaptive
queries to such distributions, it is intuitive that some kind of small-tail assumption for the distri-
butions is needed. Indeed, given any mechanism with query complexity C, there always exists a
distribution that has a sufficiently small probability mass around a sufficiently large value, such
that the mechanism cannot find it using C queries. If this probability mass is where all the revenue
comes (e.g., all the remaining probability mass is around value 0), then the mechanism cannot be a
good approximation to OPT . Following the literature [33, 18], the small-tail assumptions are such
that the expected revenue generated from the “tail” of the distributions is negligible compared to
the optimal revenue; see Section 5.1. Distributions with bounded supports automatically satisfy
these assumptions, so are regular distributions in single-item auctions.
Even with small-tail assumptions, it is hard to generate good revenue from unbounded distri-
butions with finite value queries. Instead, we show it is sufficient to use only quantile queries. As
before, the seller uses our quantile-query algorithm AQ (defined in Section 5.2) to learn a distri-
bution D′ that approximates D, and then reduces to simple mechanisms under D′. However, even
for single-item auctions, it is not so simple to show why the combination of these two parts work.
Indeed, under value queries it is easy to “under-price” the item so that the probability of sale is the
same as in the optimal mechanism for D. Under quantile queries, under-pricing may lose a large
amount of revenue because, for given quantiles, there is no guarantee on where the corresponding
values are. Instead, the main idea in using quantile queries is to “over-price” the item. This is risky
in many auction design scenarios, because it may significantly reduce the probability of sale, and
thus lose a lot of revenue. We prove a key technical lemma in Lemma 2 for single-item auctions,
where we show that by discretizing the quantile space properly, we can over-price the item while
almost preserving the probability of sale as in the optimal mechanism under D. In Lemma 4 of
Appendix C, we prove another technical lemma showing that proper over-pricing can also be done
in additive auctions.
Note that we can get the median of a distribution simply by querying the quantile 1/2. Then, for
single-parameter auctions with regular distributions, using the parametric mechanism in [1] we get
the same revenue as theirs. However, our query mechanisms can handle multi-parameter auctions
and irregular distributions.
5.1 Small-Tail Assumptions
A Bayesian auction instance I satisfies the Small-Tail Assumption 1 if there exists a function1
h : (0, 1) → (0, 1) such that, for any constant δ1 ∈ (0, 1) and any BIC mechanism M, letting
1If computation complexity is a concern, then one can further require that the function is efficiently computable.
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ǫ1 = h(δ1), we have
E
v∼D
I∃i,j,qij(vij)≤ǫ1Rev(M(v;I)) ≤ δ1OPT (I). (1)
Here qij(vij) is the quantile of vij under distribution Dij , Rev(M(v;I)) is the revenue of M under
the Bayesian instance I when the true valuation profile is v, and I is the indicator function. For
discrete distributions, Equation 1 is imposed on the ǫ1 probability mass over the highest values.
Equation 1 immediately implies the following weaker Small-Tail Assumption 2: there exists a
function h : (0, 1) → (0, 1) such that, for any constant δ1 ∈ (0, 1) , letting ǫ1 = h(δ1), we have
E
v∼D
I∃i,j,qij(vij)≤ǫ1RevOPT (v;I) ≤ δ1OPT (I). (2)
Here RevOPT (v;I) is the revenue generated by the optimal BIC mechanism for I when the true
valuation profile is v. Similar assumptions are widely adopted in sampling mechanisms to deal with
irregular distributions with unbounded supports.
5.2 The Quantile-Query Algorithm
We define our quantile-query algorithm AQ in Algorithm 5. As before, D ∈ ∆(R) is the distribution
to be queried. The algorithm takes two parameters, the tail length ǫ1 and the precision factor δ,
makes O(log1+δ
1
ǫ1
) quantile queries to the oracle, and then returns a discrete distribution D′.
Algorithm 5 The Quantile-Query Algorithm AQ
Input: the tail length ǫ1 and the precision factor δ.
1: Let k = ⌈log1+δ 1ǫ1 ⌉ and define the quantile vector as q = (q0, q1, . . . , qk−1, qk) = (1, ǫ1(1 +
δ)k−1, . . . , ǫ1(1 + δ), ǫ1).
2: Query the oracle for D with q, and receive a non-decreasing value vector (vl)l∈{0,...,k}.
3: Construct a distribution D′ as follows: D′(vl) = ql−ql+1 for each l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where qk+1 , 0.
Output: Distribution D′.
5.3 Single-Item Auctions
Mechanism 6 defines our efficient quantile Myerson mechanism MEQM .
Mechanism 6 Efficient Quantile Myerson Mechanism MEQM
1: Given ǫ > 0, run algorithm AQ with δ = ǫ3 and ǫ1 = h( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ)) (i.e., δ1 = 2ǫ3(1+ǫ) for Small Tail
Assumption 2), for each player i’s distribution Di. Denote by D′i the returned distribution. Let
D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
2: Run Myerson’s mechanism MMRS with D′ and the players’ reported values, b = (bi)i∈N , to get
allocation x = (xi)i∈N and price profile p = (pi)i∈N as the outcome.
Theorem 5. ∀ǫ > 0, any single-item instance I = (N,M,D) satisfying Small-Tail Assumption 2,
MEQM is DSIC, has query complexity O(−n log1+ ǫ
3
h( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ))), and Rev(MEQM (I)) ≥ OPT (I)1+ǫ .
Before proving Theorem 5, we first claim the following key lemma, which we prove in Appendix
C.1 via an imaginary Bayesian mechanism that “over-prices”. Recall I ′ = (N,M,D′) is the instance
under D′.
Lemma 2. Rev(MMRS(I ′)) ≥ 11+ǫOPT (I).
9
Proof of Theorem 5. First, mechanism MEQM is DSIC becauseMMRS is DSIC. Second, the query
complexity of MEQM is O(−n log1+ ǫ
3
h( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ) )), because there are k + 1 = ⌈log1+ ǫ3
1
h( 2ǫ
3(1+ǫ)
)
⌉ + 1
quantile queries for each player and there are n players in total. By definition, Rev(MEQM(I)) =
Rev(MMRS(I;D′)). By construction, D′ is stochastically dominated by D. Thus by revenue
monotonicity Rev(MMRS(I;D′)) ≥ Rev(MMRS(I ′)). Combining these two equations with Lemma
2, Theorem 5 holds.
Mechanism MEQM and Theorem 5 immediately extend to single-parameter downward-closed
settings. Finally, when the distributions are regular, we are able to prove an even better query
complexity and a matching lower-bound; see Section 6.
5.4 Unit-Demand Auctions
The unit-demand mechanism MEQUD is similar (see Mechanism 7), and we have the following.
Theorem 6. ∀ǫ > 0, any unit-demand instance I = (N,M,D) satisfying Small-Tail Assumption 2,
MEQUD is DSIC, has query complexity O(−mn log1+ ǫ
3
h( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ) )), and Rev(MEQUD(I)) ≥ OPT (I)24(1+ǫ) .
Mechanism 7 Mechanism MEQUD for Unit-Demand Auctions
1: Given ǫ > 0, run algorithm AQ with δ = ǫ3 and ǫ1 = h( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ)) (i.e., δ1 = 2ǫ3(1+ǫ) for Small Tail
Assumption 2), for each player i’s distribution Dij on each item j. Denote by D′ij the returned
distribution. Let D′i = ×j∈MD′ij and D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
2: Run mechanism MUD with D′ and the players’ reported values, b = (bij)i∈N,j∈M , to get allo-
cation x = (xij)i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (pi)i∈N as the outcome.
The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorem 3, but Lemma 2 above is used instead of
Lemma 5 of [18], and the round-down scheme is replaced by the randomized round-down scheme
designed in the proof of Lemma 2. The details have been omitted.
5.5 Additive Auctions
For additive auctions, we cannot use Small-Tail Assumption 2, because it does not imply that the
revenue loss on the tail by runningMBV CG is much less than the revenue of the optimal mechanism.
To approximate MBV CG, not only we need Small-Tail Assumption 1, but we also approximate D
by running the quantile-query algorithm AQ with different parameters. The resulting mechanism
MEQBV CG is defined in Mechanism 8, and the mechanism MEQIM simply replaces MBV CG with
MIM . Again, in the final mechanism MEQA the seller randomly chooses between the two query
mechanisms, according to probabilities defined in the analysis. We have the following theorem,
proved in Appendix C.2.
Mechanism 8 Mechanism MEQBV CG for Additive Auctions
1: Given ǫ > 0, run algorithm AQ with δ = (1 + ǫ5)1/m − 1 and ǫ1 = h( ǫ10(1+ǫ) ) (i.e., δ1 = ǫ10(1+ǫ)
for Small Tail Assumption 1), for each player i’s distribution Dij on each item j. Denote by D′ij
the returned distribution. Let D′i = ×j∈MD′ij and D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
2: Run MBV CG with D′ and the players’ reported values, b = (bij)i∈N,j∈M , to get allocation
x = (xij)i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (pi)i∈N as the outcome.
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Theorem 7. ∀ǫ > 0, any additive instance I = (N,M,D) satisfying Small-Tail Assumption 1,
MEQA is DSIC, has query complexity O(−m2n log1+ ǫ
5
h( ǫ10(1+ǫ) ), and Rev(MEQA(I)) ≥ OPT (I)8(1+ǫ) .
The main advantage of using quantile queries is to handle unbounded distributions. In addition,
we can use the resulting query mechanisms to construct sampling mechanisms; see Appendix E. As
shown in Theorem 7, the query complexity of mechanism MEQA has an extra factor of m compared
with that ofMEV A (and the lower bound). It would be interesting to see whether our lower-bounds
can be improved in this scenario.
5.6 Using Quantile Queries for Bounded Distributions
As a corollary, Theorems 5, 6 and 7 also provide another way to approximate the optimal BIC
revenue using only quantile queries when the distributions are bounded. More precisely, we have
the following, proved in Appendix C.3.
Corollary 1. For any ǫ > 0, H > 1, and prior distribution D with each Dij bounded within
[1,H], there exist DSIC mechanisms that use O(mn log1+ǫ
nmH(1+ǫ)
ǫ ) quantile queries for single-item
auctions and unit-demand auctions, and use O(m2n log1+ǫ
nmH(1+ǫ)
ǫ ) quantile queries for additive
auctions, whose approximation ratios to OPT are respectively 1 + ǫ, 24(1 + ǫ) and 8(1 + ǫ).
6 Single-Item Auctions with Regular Distributions
In this section, we show that when we only consider regular distributions for single-item auctions,
the query complexity can be much lower. In fact, we no longer need the small-tail assumptions even
when the supports are unbounded. Here our lower- and upper-bounds are tight upto a logarithmic
factor, and require different techniques from previous sections.
For the lower-bound, recall that in Section 3 we allow the distributions to be irregular. To
construct the desired distributions, we can first find the un-queried quantile interval and then
move the probability mass from its end points to internal points. Because the distributions can
be irregular, we have complete control on where to put the probability mass. However, if the
distributions have to be regular then this cannot be done. Instead, we start from two different
single-peak revenue curves and construct regular distributions from them. We still want to move
probability mass from the end points of the un-queried quantile interval to internal points, but such
moves must be continuous in order to preserve regularity.
For the upper-bound, we show that regular distributions satisfy the small-tail property with a
properly defined tail function. Thus our techniques for distributions with small-tails directly apply
here.
6.1 Lower Bound
With regular distributions, by [19] it is sufficient to use a single sample to achieve 2-approximation in
revenue for single-player single-item auctions. Because every distribution is a uniform distribution
in the quantile space, a sample for such auctions can be obtained by first choosing a quantile q
uniformly at random from [0, 1] and then making a quantile query. Thus, a single query is also
sufficient for 2-approximation in this case. As such, unlike Theorem 1 where we have proved lower
bounds for the query complexity for arbitrary constant approximations, for regular distributions we
consider lower bounds for (1 + ǫ)-approximations, where ǫ is sufficiently small. More precisely, we
have the following, proved in Appendix D.1.
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Theorem 8. For any constant ǫ ∈ (0, 164 ), there exists a constant C such that, for any n ≥ 1, any
DSIC Bayesian mechanism M making less than Cnǫ−1 non-adaptive value and quantile queries to
the oracle, there exists a multi-player single-item Bayesian auction instance I = (N,M,D) where
|N | = n and D is regular, such that Rev(M(I)) < OPT (I)1+ǫ .
6.2 Upper Bound
Our mechanismMEMR (i.e., “Efficient quantile Myerson mechanism for Regular distributions”) first
constructs the distribution D′ that approximates D using the quantile-query algorithm AQ with
parameters δ = ǫ4 and ǫ1 =
ǫ2
256n ; and then runs Myerson’s mechanism MMRS on D′. Formally, we
have the following theorem, proved in Appendix D.2.
Theorem 9. ∀ǫ ∈ (0, 1), and for any single-item instance I = (N,M,D) where D is regular,
mechanism MEMR is DSIC, has query complexity O(n log1+ǫ nǫ ), and Rev(MEMR(I)) ≥ OPT (I)1+ǫ .
Following [15, 28, 18], the sample complexity for single-item auction with regular distributions
is bounded between Ω(max{nǫ−1, ǫ−3}) and O˜(nǫ−4). However, each sample is a valuation profile
of the players, and thus contains n values. When ǫ is small, the query complexity in this setting is
O(nǫ−1 log nǫ ). Thus the query complexity is still much lower than the sample complexity.
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A Missing Materials for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 (restated). For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for any large
enough H, any DSIC Bayesian mechanismM making less than C logcH (randomized) non-adaptive
value and quantile queries to the oracle, there exists a single-player single-item Bayesian auction
instance I = (N,M,D) where the values are bounded in [1,H], such that Rev(M(I)) < OPT (I)c .
Proof. Given c, for any constant H, let k , ⌊14 log(8c)4c+2 H⌋. When H is large enough, we have
k = ⌊ logcH
4(4c + 2) logc(8c)
⌋ ≥ 1.
We divide the quantile interval [0, 1] and the value interval [1,H] into k + 1 sub-intervals, with
their right-ends defined as follows: qk = 1, qs =
qs+1
(8c)4c+2
for each s ∈ {k − 1, . . . , 0}, uk = H, and
us =
us+1
(4c)4c+2
for each s ∈ {k − 1, . . . , 0}. It is easy to see
q0 =
1
(8c)k(4c+2)
≥ H− 14 and u0 = H
(4c)k(4c+2)
≥ H · q0 ≥ H
3
4 .
From now on, we will ignore the intervals below u0 and q0.
Let c′ , 1 − 12c and C , 1−c
′
8(4c+2) logc(8c)
= 116c(4c+2) logc(8c)
. We have C logcH < k(1 − c′).
Accordingly, for any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M that makes less than C logcH non-adaptive
value and quantile queries, there exist a value interval (us, us+1) and a quantile interval (qt, qt+1)
such that, with probability at least c′, no value in (us, us+1) is queried and no quantile in (qt, qt+1)
is queried either. Indeed, if this is not the case, then for any pair (us, us+1) and (qt, qt+1), with
probability greater than 1 − c′, either (us, us+1) is queried or (qt, qt+1) is queried. Since there are
k value intervals and k quantile intervals, the expected total number of queries made by M is at
least k(1 − c′) > C logcH, a contradiction.
We now construct ⌈4c⌉ different single-player single-item Bayesian instances {Iz =
(N,M,Dz)}z∈[⌈4c⌉], where the distributions outside the value range (us, us+1) and the quantile range
(qt, qt+1) are all the same. Given such Dz’s, with probability at least c
′ = 1 − 12c mechanism M
cannot distinguish the Iz’s from each other. We then show that when this happens, mechanism M
cannot be a 2c-approximation for all instances Iz.
More precisely, the distribution Dz for each z ∈ [⌈4c⌉] is defined in Table 3 and illustrated in
Figure 1. Here δ is a small constant whose value will be determined in the analysis.
Value vz 1 us (4c)
zus us+1
Probability of vz 1− qt+1 δ qt+1 − qt − 2δ qt + δ
Table 3: Distribution Dz.
It is easy to see that for each value query from [1, us] ∪ [us+1,H], the returned quantile is the
same for all Dz’s. Moreover, when a quantile query is from [0, qt] ∪ [qt+1, 1], the oracle’s answer is
again the same for all Dz’s, as illustrated in Table 4. Accordingly, with probability at least 1− 12c ,
mechanismM cannot distinguish Dz’s from each other, which means it cannot distinguish Iz’s from
each other.
We now analyze the optimal BIC revenue for those instances. For any Iz, Myerson’s mechanism
is optimal: it sets a (randomized) threshold for the unique player, if the player bids at least the
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✲✻
1− qt+1
1− qt+1 + δ
1− qt − δ
1
Fz(vz)
1 us (4c)
zus us+1 H vz0
Figure 1: The cumulative probability function of Dz.
Quantile queries Corresponding values Oracle’s answer
0 (us+1,+∞) +∞
(0, qt + δ) ∅ us+1
qt + δ ((4c)
zus, us+1] us+1
(qt + δ, qt+1 − δ) ∅ (4c)zus
qt+1 − δ (us, (4c)zus] (4c)zus
(qt+1 − δ, qt+1) ∅ us
qt+1 (1, us] us
(qt+1, 1) ∅ 1
1 1 1
Table 4: Quantile queries and corresponding answers for Dz.
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threshold then he gets the item and pays the threshold payment, otherwise the item is unsold.
Letting δ , 1H , it is not hard to verify that OPT (Iz) = (4c)zus(qt+1 − δ) for each Iz.
Next, we analyze the revenue of M. Since M is DSIC, the allocation rule must be monotone
in the player’s bid, and he will pay the threshold payment set by M, denoted by P . Here P may
also be randomized. Note that for all instances, setting P < 4cus is strictly worse than setting
P = 4cus, and setting P > (4c)
⌈4c⌉us is strictly worse than setting P = (4c)
⌈4c⌉us < us+1. Also, for
any instance Iz and any z′ ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈4c⌉ − 1}, setting P ∈ ((4c)z′us, (4c)z′+1us) is strictly worse
than setting P = (4c)z
′+1us. Thus, when mechanism M cannot distinguish the Iz’s, it must use
the same P for all Iz’s, and the best it can do is to set P = (4c)zus with some probability ρz for
each z ∈ [⌈4c⌉]. Because ∑z∈[⌈4c⌉] ρz = 1, there exists z∗ such that ρz∗ ≤ 14c . Thus we have
Rev(M(Iz∗)) ≤ 1
4c
· (4c)z∗ · us · (qt+1 − δ) + (1− 1
4c
)(4c)z
∗−1 · us · (qt+1 − δ)
<
1
2c
· (4c)z∗ · us · (qt+1 − δ) = 1
2c
OPT (Iz∗),
where the first inequality is because for any threshold other than (4c)z
∗
us, the resulting expected
revenue is no larger than that with the threshold being (4c)z
∗−1us. That is, when M cannot
distinguish the Iz’s, it cannot be a 2c-approximation for Iz∗.
As the revenue of M under Iz∗ is at most OPT (Iz∗) when it is able to distinguish Iz∗ from all
the other instances, we have
Rev(M(Iz∗)) ≤ (1− 1
2c
)
1
2c
OPT (Iz∗) + 1
2c
OPT (Iz∗) < 1
c
OPT (Iz∗).
Thus M is not a c-approximation for Iz∗, and Lemma 1 holds.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
To make our exposition clearer, we first introduce some notations. A very broad class of Bayesian
auctions, (monotone) sub-additive auctions, is such that each player i has a valuation function
vi : 2
[m] → R, which satisfies vi(S) + vi(T ) ≥ vi(S ∪ T ) ≥ vi(S) ≥ 0 for any subsets of items S
and T . As such a valuation function in general needs 2m values to describe, following the conventions
in Bayesian auction design [34, 13, 10], we will consider succinct sub-additive auctions, where only
the item-values, that is, the vij ’s, are independently drawn from the underlying distribution D =
×i∈[n],j∈[m]Dij. Given (vij)j∈[m], it is publicly known how to compute player i’s value for any subset
of items. That is, the valuation function vi now takes a vector of item-values (vij)j∈[m] and a subset
S ⊆ [m] as inputs, such that for any vector (vij)j∈[m], the resulting function vi((vij)j∈[m], ·) is sub-
additive and vi((vij)j∈[m], {j}) = vij for each item j. Note that such auctions include single-item,
unit-demand and additive auctions as special cases.
Theorem 1 (restated). For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for
any n ≥ 1,m ≥ 1, any large enough H, any succinct sub-additive valuation function profile v =
(vi)i∈[n], and any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M making less than Cnm logcH non-adaptive value
and quantile queries to the oracle, there exists a multi-item Bayesian auction instance I = (N,M,D)
with valuation profile v, where |N | = n, |M | = m and the item values are bounded in [1,H], such
that Rev(M(I)) < OPT (I)c .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, for anyH, let k , ⌊14 log(8c)4c+2 H⌋ and C , 124c(4c+2) logc(8c) .
Let H be large enough so that k ≥ 1. It is easy to see that Cnm logcH < nmk3c . Thus, for any DSIC
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Bayesian mechanism M that makes less than Cnm logcH non-adaptive value and quantile queries,
there exists a player-item pair (i∗, j∗), a value interval (us, us+1) and a quantile interval (qt, qt+1)
such that, with probability at least 1− 13c ,M does not query these two intervals for player i∗’s value
distribution for item j∗. We will focus on i∗, j∗ and the two intervals, and show that M cannot
generate good revenue from them.
We construct ⌈4c⌉ Bayesian instances, Iz = (N,M,Dz) with z ∈ [⌈4c⌉], where each Dz =
×i∈[n],j∈[m]Dzij is the prior distribution for the players’ item values. For each z, i, j, the distribution
Dzij is constantly 1 if i 6= i∗ or j 6= j∗. Let Dzi∗j∗ be the distribution Dz defined in Table 3.
Given any succinct sub-additive valuation function profile v = (vi)i∈[n] where each vi takes a
vector of item-values (vij)j∈[m] as part of its input, we would like to compare the optimal revenue for
the sub-additive instances defined by the Iz’s with the corresponding expected revenue of M. By
construction, the Dz’s differ only at the Dzi∗j∗ ’s, within the value interval (us, us+1) and the quantile
interval (qt, qt+1). Accordingly, with probability at least 1 − 13c , mechanism M cannot distinguish
the Iz’s from each other. Eventually, we will analyze the revenue of M conditional on this event
happening.
For now, to compare the optimal revenue and that of M, let us first introduce some notations.
For any item-value profile vˆ = (vˆij)i∈[n],j∈[m], when the players bid vˆ, we denote by xi(vˆ) the
(randomized) allocation of M to a player i. It is defined by the probabilities σiS(vˆ) for all the
subsets S ⊆ [m]: each σiS(vˆ) is the probability that player i receives S under bid vˆ. Accordingly,
the expected value of player i for allocation xi(vˆ) is vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ)) =
∑
S vi((vˆij)j∈[m], S)·σiS(vˆ).
Moreover, for each item j, let xij(vˆ) be the probability that player i receives item j according to
xi(vˆ): that is, xij(vˆ) =
∑
S:j∈S σiS(vˆ).
We upper-bound the revenue ofM in three steps. To begin with, we reduce the multi-player sub-
additive instances to single-player sub-additive instances, and construct a DSIC Bayesian mechanism
M∗ that only sells the items to player i∗. Given any instance Iz, mechanism M∗ runs on the
single-player sub-additive instance Izi∗ = ({i∗},M,Dzi∗). It first simulates the item values of players
in N \ {i∗}, which are all 1’s, and then runs M. Mechanism M∗ answers the oracle queries of M
truthfully. The allocation and the payment for player i∗ under M∗ is the same as those under M.
For any player i 6= i∗, mechanism M∗ assigns nothing to him and charges him 0, because i is an
imaginary player to M∗. It is easy to see that mechanism M∗ is DSIC. Moreover,
Rev(M∗(Izi∗)) ≥ Rev(M(Iz))− Evˆ∼Dz
∑
i 6=i∗
vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ)), (3)
because the revenue generated by M from players in N \ {i∗} is at most their total value for the
allocation.
Next, we reduce the single-player sub-additive instances to single-player additive instances, and
construct a DSIC Bayesian mechanism M+ that runs on the single-player additive instances I+zi∗ =
({i∗},M,Dzi∗), with z ∈ [⌈4c⌉]. Note that each I+zi∗ has the same item-value distributions as Izi∗ ,
but player i∗’s value for any subset of items is additive.
For each single-player sub-additive instance defined by Izi∗ and the valuation function profile v,
by the taxation principle [23], mechanism M∗ is equivalent to providing a menu of options to player
i∗ and then letting i∗ choose a menu entry maximizing his expected utility according to his true
valuation. Given any instance I+zi∗ , mechanism M+ provides the same menu as mechanism M∗
under Izi∗ and v, except that the payment in each entry is discounted by a multiplicative 1− ǫˆ. Here
ǫˆ is a sufficiently small constant in (0, 1) to be determined later in the analysis. The truthfulness
of M+ is immediate, because it lets i∗ choose a menu entry maximizing his expected utility under
16
his true additive values. Let
δ¯ , Evˆi∗∼Dzi∗ maxS⊆[m]
(
∑
j∈S
vˆi∗j − vi∗((vˆi∗j)j∈[m], S)),
the expected maximum difference between the additive values and the succinct sub-additive values.
Following Lemma 3.4 in [34], which compares the revenue in the sub-additive instance with that in
the corresponding additive instance, we have
Rev(M+(I+zi∗ )) ≥ (1− ǫˆ)(Rev(M∗(Izi∗))− δ¯/ǫˆ). (4)
Finally, we reduce the single-player additive instances to single-player single-item instances, and
construct a DSIC Bayesian mechanism M′ that only sells item j∗ to player i∗. Mechanism M′
runs on the single-player single-item instances Izi∗j∗ = ({i∗}, {j∗},Dzi∗j∗), with z ∈ [⌈4c⌉]. Given
any Izi∗j∗, it first lets player i∗ report vˆi∗j∗. Then it simulates the vˆi∗j ’s from Dzi∗j for j 6= j∗, which
are all 1’s, and runs M+ on the augmented additive instance I+zi∗ to obtain allocation x+i∗(vˆi∗) and
payment p+i∗(vˆi∗). For each item j, let x
+
i∗j(vˆi∗) be the probability that player i
∗ receives item j in
the allocation. Mechanism M′ sets its outcome to be the following:
• x′i∗j∗(vˆi∗j∗) = x+i∗j∗(vˆi∗); and
• p′i∗(vˆi∗j∗) = p+i∗(vˆi∗)−
∑
j∈[m]\{j∗} vˆi∗jx
+
i∗j(vˆi∗).
Note that p′i∗(vˆi∗j∗) may be negative. By Lemma 21 of [25], mechanism M′ is DSIC and
Rev(M′(Izi∗j∗)) ≥ Rev(M+(I+zi∗ ))−
∑
j 6=j∗
Evˆi∗j∼D
z
i∗j
vˆi∗j . (5)
Now we combine the above three reduction steps together and consider the event when mecha-
nism M cannot distinguish the Iz’s from each other. When this happens, mechanism M produces
the same outcome for all the instances. Accordingly, although mechanism M∗ is given the distri-
butions Dzi∗ , by simulating M, it still produces the same outcome for all the Izi∗ ’s, thus the same
menu for all of them. So mechanism M+ also produces the same menu for all the I+zi∗ ’s: that is, the
menu produced by M∗ with the payments discounted by 1 − ǫˆ. As a result, although mechanism
M′ is given the Dzi∗j∗ ’s, it still cannot “distinguish” the Izi∗j∗ ’s from each other and produces the
same outcome for all of them. Following the proof of Lemma 1, in this case there exists z∗ ∈ [⌈4c⌉]
such that
Rev(M′(Iz∗i∗j∗)) <
1
2c
OPT (Iz∗i∗j∗).
Combining this inequality with Equations 3, 4 and 5, we have
Rev(M(Iz∗)) ≤ Rev(M∗(Iz∗i∗ )) + Evˆ∼Dz∗
∑
i 6=i∗
vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ))
≤ Rev(M
+(I+z∗i∗ ))
1− ǫˆ + δ¯/ǫˆ+ Evˆ∼Dz∗
∑
i 6=i∗
vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ))
≤ 1
1− ǫˆ

Rev(M′(Iz∗i∗j∗)) + ∑
j 6=j∗
Evˆi∗j∼D
z∗
i∗j
vˆi∗j

+ δ¯/ǫˆ+ Evˆ∼Dz∗ ∑
i 6=i∗
vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ))
<
1
1− ǫˆ

 1
2c
OPT (Iz∗i∗j∗) +
∑
j 6=j∗
Evˆi∗j∼D
z∗
i∗j
vˆi∗j

+ δ¯/ǫˆ+ Evˆ∼Dz∗ ∑
i 6=i∗
vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ)).
(6)
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Note that OPT (Iz∗i∗j∗) ≤ OPT (Iz
∗
), since selling a single item to a single player is a feasible
outcome. Moreover, since Dz∗ij is constantly 1 when i 6= i∗ or j 6= j∗, and since the valuation function
profile v is succinct sub-additive, we have∑
j 6=j∗
Evˆi∗j∼D
z∗
i∗j
vˆi∗j = m− 1,
δ¯/ǫˆ =
1
ǫˆ
Evˆi∗∼D
z∗
i∗
max
S⊆[m]
(
∑
j∈S
vˆi∗j − vi∗((vˆi∗j)j∈[m], S)) ≤
m− 1
ǫˆ
, and
Evˆ∼Dz∗
∑
i 6=i∗
vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ)) ≤ m.
Here the second equation is because
∑
j∈S vˆi∗j − vi∗((vˆi∗j)j∈[m], S) ≤ m− 1 for any vˆi∗ and S. The
third equation is because
∑
i 6=i∗ vi((vˆij)j∈[m], xi(vˆ)) ≤ m for any vˆ: indeed, each item can be sold
to at most one player, generating value 1.
Combining the equations above with Equation 6, we have
Rev(M(Iz∗)) < 1
1− ǫˆ
(
1
2c
OPT (Iz∗) +m− 1
)
+
m− 1
ǫˆ
+m.
Setting ǫˆ = 14 , we have
Rev(M(Iz∗)) < 2
3c
OPT (Iz∗) + 19m
3
. (7)
Finally, we combine Equation 7 with the probability that M cannot distinguish the Iz’s, which
is 1 − 13c . Recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that q0 ≥ H−
1
4 and u0 ≥ H 34 . By selling item j∗ to
player i∗ at price u0, we have OPT (Iz∗) ≥ u0q0 ≥
√
H. When H > (572 mc
2)2, OPT (Iz∗) > 572 mc2
and
Rev(M(Iz∗)) ≤ (1− 1
3c
)(
2
3c
OPT (Iz∗) + 19m
3
) +
1
3c
OPT (Iz∗) < 1
c
OPT (Iz∗).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Missing Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Unit-Demand Auctions
Before analyzing mechanism MEV UD, let us first recall the sequential post-price mechanism MUD.
This mechanism processes the players one by one according to an arbitrary order, computes a price
for each player i based on remaining items, remaining players and the prior distribution, and lets i
choose his utility-maximizing item (or choose none). The revenue of this mechanism is analyzed by
reducing the unit-demand instance to the COPIES setting, which we introduce below.
For a unit-demand auction instance I = (N,M,D), the corresponding COPIES instance is
denoted by ICP = (NCP ,MCP ,D), where each player i ∈ N has m copies and each item j ∈ M
has n copies, and player i’s copy j is only interested in item j’s copy i, with value vij drawn
independently from Dij . Thus NCP = MCP = N ×M , and ICP is a single-parameter instance.
Denote by Ni the set of player i’s copies and by Mj the set of item j’s copies. Note that both
{Ni}i∈N and {Mj}j∈M are partitions of NCP (and MCP ). Two natural constraints are imposed on
feasible allocations under the COPIES setting, so as to connect it with the original unit-demand
setting: (1) for each player i, at most one of his copies gets an item; and (2) for each item j, at most
one of its copies gets allocated. Accordingly, letting qs be the probability that a feasible mechanism
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allocates an item to a player copy s ∈ NCP , we have∑s∈Ni qs ≤ 1 for each i ∈ N and∑s∈Mj qs ≤ 1
for each j ∈M .
The corresponding mechanism MCPUD for the COPIES setting works in the same way as MUD,
except that it considers an arbitrary order of the players in NCP , thus different copies of the same
player may not be processed together. When evaluating the performance of mechanism MCPUD, the
order of the players is chosen by an online adaptive adversary, who tries to minimize the expected
revenue of the mechanism. Because this adversary is the worst-case for mechanism MCPUD,
Rev(MUD(I;D′)) ≥ Rev(MCPUD(ICP ;D′))
for any distribution D′, where the latter is the expected revenue of MCPUD under the online adaptive
adversary. Indeed, mechanism MUD can be considered as MCPUD under a specific order where all
copies of each player come together, thus the revenue is at least that when the order of NCP is
adaptively chosen by the adversary. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (restated). ∀ǫ > 0, for any unit-demand Bayesian instance I = (N,M,D) with values
bounded within [1,H], mechanism MEV UD is DSIC, has query complexity O(mn log1+ǫH), and
Rev(MEV UD(I)) ≥ 1
24(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I).
Proof. It is easy to see that the query complexity of MEV UD is O(mn log1+ǫH), since each distri-
bution Dij needs O(log1+ǫH) value queries. Also, it is immediate that MEV UD is DSIC.
Below we prove the revenue bound. By construction,
Rev(MEV UD(I)) = Rev(MUD(I;D′)). (8)
Let I ′ = (N,M,D′) and I ′CP = (NCP ,MCP ,D′). We state the following key lemma, which is
proved after the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 3. Rev(MUD(I;D′)) ≥ Rev(MCPUD(ICP ;D′)) = Rev(MCPUD(I ′CP )).
By Theorem 1 of [29], the sequential post-price mechanism is at least a 6-approximation to the
optimal BIC revenue in the COPIES setting. Thus
Rev(MCPUD(I ′CP )) ≥
1
6
OPT (I ′CP ). (9)
Next, because the COPIES setting is a single-parameter setting, and because of the way we discretize
the value space in algorithm AV , by Lemma 5 of [18] we have
OPT (I ′CP ) ≥ 1
1 + ǫ
OPT (ICP ). (10)
Finally, by Theorem 6 of [9], the optimal BIC revenue in the COPIES setting is a 4-approximation
to the optimal BIC revenue in the original unit-demand setting. Thus
OPT (ICP ) ≥ 1
4
OPT (I). (11)
Combining Equations 8, 9, 10, 11 and Lemma 3, Theorem 3 holds.
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Proof of Lemma 3. The inequality is already explained. Now we prove the equality. For any value
profile v ∼ D, let v′ be v rounded down to the support of D′. That is, for each vij , v′ij is the largest
value in the support of D′ij that is less than or equal to vij . Recall that the support of D′ij is the set
{v0, · · · , vk} as defined in the query algorithm AV . By the definition of D′ij , for any 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 1,
Pr
vij∼Dij
[v′ij = vl] = Pr
vij∼Dij
[vij ≥ vl]− Pr
vij∼Dij
[vij ≥ vl+1] = q(vl)− q(vl+1) = ql − ql+1 = D′ij(vl),
and
Pr
vij∼Dij
[v′ij = vk] = Pr
vij∼Dij
[vij ≥ vk] = q(vk) = qk = D′ij(vk).
That is, if v is distributed according to D then v′ is distributed according to D′.
For any value profile v and the corresponding v′, arbitrarily fix an order σ of the players in NCP ,
which is a bijection from {1, · · · ,mn} to {1, · · · ,mn}. Without loss of generality, each player σ(s)
gets the corresponding item σ(s) whenever his true value is greater than or equal to the posted price
for him. Below we show that mechanism MCPUD produces the same outcome no matter the players’
true values are v or v′. That is, for any s ∈ {1, . . . ,mn}, (1) MCPUD produces the same price pσ(s)
under v and v′ for player σ(s), and (2) vσ(s) ≥ pσ(s) if and only if v′σ(s) ≥ pσ(s).
To prove these two properties, note that by the construction of mechanismMCPUD, the price pσ(s)
posted to σ(s) depends only on the distribution D′ and the set Aσ(s) of items sold to the players
arriving before σ(s). Here pσ(s) may be randomized if D′σ(s) is irregular, but it always takes value
in the support of D′σ(s) (except that, if selling the corresponding item σ(s) to player σ(s) is not
feasible anymore, then pσ(s) = +∞).
We prove the two desired properties by induction. When s = 1, property (1) trivially holds,
because Aσ(1) = ∅ under both value profiles. Furthermore, because a realization of pσ(1) is always
in the support of D′σ(1), and because v′σ(1) is vσ(1) rounded down to the support of D′σ(1), property
(2) holds when s = 1.
Now assume (1) and (2) hold for any s ≤ t with t < mn. We show they also hold for s = t+ 1.
Indeed, the inductive hypothesis implies that for any s ≤ t, Aσ(s) is the same under the two value
profiles. In particular, Aσ(t+1) is the same, which means the price pσ(t+1) is the same. Thus property
(1) holds. Property (2) also holds because a realization of pσ(t+1) is always in the support of D′σ(t+1).
In sum, for any order σ, mechanism MCPUD produces the same outcome under the two value profiles
v and v′, thus the same revenue.
Accordingly, under the online adaptive adversary for (ICP ;D′), the revenue Rev(MCPUD(ICP ;D′))
is the same as the revenue when the players’ true values are obtained by rounding v ∼ D to v′.
Because the resulting v′ is distributed according to D′, Rev(MCPUD(ICP ;D′)) is at least the expected
revenue of MCPUD under the online adaptive adversary for I ′CP . Indeed, a randomized adversary
for I ′CP can simulate the adversary for (ICP ;D′): in each step, given v′s with s ∈ NCP being the
player in this step, the former first samples vs from Ds conditional on vs rounded down to v′s, and
then uses the latter to decide which player arrives next. Thus,
Rev(MCPUD(ICP ;D′)) ≥ Rev(MCPUD(I ′CP )).
Similarly,
Rev(MCPUD(ICP ;D′)) ≤ Rev(MCPUD(I ′CP )).
Therefore Rev(MCPUD(ICP ;D′)) = Rev(MCPUD(I ′CP )) and Lemma 3 holds.
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B.2 Additive Auctions
Theorem 4 (restated). ∀ǫ > 0, for any additive instance I = (N,M,D) with values in [1,H],
mechanism MEV A is DSIC, has query complexity O(mn log1+ǫH), and
Rev(MEV A(I)) ≥ OPT (I)
8(1 + ǫ)
.
Proof. First, it is easy to see that the query complexity of mechanism MEV A is O(mn log1+δ H),
since there are in total mn distributions and each one of them needs O(log1+δH) value queries
in the algorithm AV . Since δ =
√
ǫ+ 1 − 1, O(mn log1+δH) = O(mn log1+ǫH). Second, since
mechanisms MBV CG and MIM are both DSIC, MEV A is DSIC.
Recall that mechanismMEV A randomly chooses between runningMEV IM and runningMEV BV CG.
Therefore, to upper-bound the optimal revenue OPT (I) using Rev(MEV A(I)), we only need to
upper-bound OPT (I) using Rev(MEV IM(I)) and Rev(MEV BV CG(I)).
As in [9], we only need to consider the prior distribution D with finite support. Let Vij be the
support of Dij for each player i and item j, Vi = ×j∈MVij and V = ×i∈NVi. In the optimal BIC
mechanism, when player i bids vi, let πij(vi) be the probability for him to get item j and pi(vi) be
his expected payment, taken over the randomness of the other players’ values and the randomness
of the mechanism. Let π = (πij(vi))i∈N,j∈M,vi∈Vi and p = (pi(vi))i∈N,vi∈Vi . The pair (π, p) is called
the reduced form (of the optimal BIC mechanism) [7].
Denote by ϕ˜ij(vij)Myerson’s (ironed) virtual value when player i’s value on item j is vij . For any
value sub-profile v−i of the players other than i, let βij(v−i) = maxi′ 6=i vi′j: that is, the highest bid
on item j excluding player i. Moreover, let rij(v−i) = maxx≥βij(v−i){x·Prvij∼Dij [vij ≥ x]}, ri(v−i) =∑
j rij(v−i), ri = Ev−i∼D−i [ri(v−i)], and finally r =
∑
i ri. Note that r is the expected revenue by
running the 1-look-ahead mechanism of [32] for each item separately, and r ≤ Rev(MIM (I)).
Next, we use a different method from [9] to partition each player i’s value space Vi into m+ 1
subsets. More precisely, given δ > 0 and v−i, let R
(v−i)
0 = {vi ∈ Vi | vij < (1 + δ)βij(v−i),∀j}. For
any vi /∈ R(v−i)0 , let j = argmax{vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i)} with ties broken lexicographically, and add
vi to the set R
(v−i)
j : note that vij − (1+ δ)βij (v−i) ≥ 0 in this case. Similar to Theorem 3 of [9], the
optimal BIC revenue can be upper-bounded by the sum of the following terms, where Di(vi) and
D−i(v−i) are respectively the probabilities of vi and v−i under D, and I is the indicator function:
OPT (I) ≤ Single + Under + Over + Tail + Core, (12)
where
Single =
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) · ϕ˜ij(vij) · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[vi ∈ R(v−i)j ],
Under =
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) ·
∑
v−i∈V−i
vij · D−i(v−i)Ivij<(1+δ)βij (v−i),
Over =
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) ·
∑
v−i∈V−i
(1 + δ)βij(v−i)D−i(v−i)Ivij≥(1+δ)βij (v−i),
Tail =
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
vij>(1+δ)βij (v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij) · (vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i))
· Pr
vi,−j∼Di,−j
[∃k 6= j, vik − (1 + δ)βik(v−i) ≥ vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i)],
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and
Core =
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
(1+δ)βij (v−i)≤vij≤(1+δ)βij (v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij)
· (vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i)).
In the following, we bound these terms in Inequality 12 separately. Note that when MEV IM
uses the value-query algorithm AV to learn a distribution, the parameters are also set to be H and
δ =
√
ǫ+ 1− 1. Thus, applying Theorem 2 to each item, we have
Rev(MIM (I)) ≤ (1 + δ)Rev(MEV IM(I)).
For the terms Single, Under, Over and Tail, we are able to upper-bound them usingRev(MEV IM (I)).
Following Lemma 13 of [9], although the term Single has changed from its original form, we still
have
Single =
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) · ϕ˜ij(vij) · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[vi ∈ R(v−i)j ]
≤ Rev(MIM (I)) ≤ (1 + δ)Rev(MEV IM (I)). (13)
Next, using Lemmas 14 and 15 of [9], we upper-bound the term Under as follows:
Under =
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) ·
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i) · vij · Ivij<(1+δ)βij (v−i)
=
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) ·
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i) · vij
·(Ivij<βij(v−i) + Iβij(v−i)≤vij<(1+δ)βij (v−i))
≤
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) ·
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
·(vij · Ivij<βij(v−i) + (1 + δ)βij(v−i) · Ivij≥βij(v−i))
≤ Rev(MIM (I)) + (1 + δ)Rev(MIM (I)) ≤ 2(1 + δ)2Rev(MEV IM (I)).
The second inequality above is by Lemmas 14 and 15 of [9], which respectively upper-bound the
term Over and the term Under in the original setting. Indeed, we split our term Under into the
sum of the original terms Under and Over. Using the above equation, the approximation ratio to
OPT (I) will be 9(1 + ǫ) eventually. To get the desired 8(1 + ǫ)-approximation, we prove a variant
of Lemma 15 of [9], which directly upper-bounds our term Under as
Under ≤ (1 + δ)Rev(MIM (I)) ≤ (1 + δ)2Rev(MEV IM (I)). (14)
The actual proof of this alternative lemma is tedious and does not provide new insights to our result,
thus has been omitted.
Next, we upper-bound the term Over:
Over =
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) ·
∑
v−i∈V−i
(1 + δ)βij(v−i)D−i(v−i)Ivij≥(1+δ)βij (v−i)
≤ (1 + δ)
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
∑
j
Di(vi) · πij(vi) ·
∑
v−i∈V−i
βij(v−i)D−i(v−i)Ivij≥βij(v−i)
≤ (1 + δ)Rev(MIM (I)) ≤ (1 + δ)2Rev(MEV IM (I)). (15)
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The second inequality above is by Lemma 14 of [9].
Next, we upper-bound the term Tail, which is similar to the analysis of [9], but with the threshold
price βij(v−i) scaled up by a factor of (1 + δ).
Tail =
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
vij>(1+δ)βij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij) · (vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i))
· Pr
vi,−j∼Di,−j
[∃k 6= j, vik − (1 + δ)βik(v−i) ≥ vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i)]
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
vij>(1+δ)βij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij) · (vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i))
· Pr
vi,−j∼Di,−j
[∃k 6= j, vik − βik(v−i) ≥ vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i)]
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
vij>(1+δ)βij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij) · (vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i))
·
m∑
k=1
Pr
vik∼Dik
[vik ≥ vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i) + βik(v−i)]
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
vij>(1+δ)βij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij)
·
m∑
k=1
(vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i) + βik(v−i)) Pr
vik∼Dik
[vik ≥ vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i) + βik(v−i)]
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
vij>(1+δ)βij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij)
m∑
k=1
rik(v−i)
=
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
ri(v−i)
∑
vij>(1+δ)βij (v−i)+ri(v−i)
Dij(vij)
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
((1 + δ)βij(v−i) + ri(v−i))
· Pr
vij∼Dij
[vij > (1 + δ)βij(v−i) + ri(v−i)]
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
rij(v−i) =
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)ri(v−i) =
∑
i
ri
= r ≤ Rev(MIM (I)) ≤ (1 + δ)Rev(MEV IM (I)). (16)
The second inequality above is by union bound. The fourth and sixth inequalities use twice the
definition of rij(v−i), which sets the optimal price to maximize the expected revenue generated by
selling item j to i. The second equality is by the definition of ri(v−i).
Finally, we upper-bound the term Core. The Core part is the most complicated, and we use
MEV BV CG and MEV IM together to upper-bound it. To do so, below we rewrite Core into a
different form. Similar to [9], arbitrarily fixing v−i and letting vij ∼ Dij , define the following two
new random variables, which again scale the threshold price βij(v−i) up by a factor of (1 + δ):
bij(v−i) = (vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i))Ivij≥(1+δ)βij (v−i),
and
cij(v−i) = bij(v−i)Ibij(v−i)≤ri(v−i).
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Therefore, we have
Core =
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)
∑
j
Evij∼Dij [cij(v−i)].
Letting ei(v−i) =
∑
j Evij∼Dij [cij(v−i)] − 2ri(v−i), following the proof of Lemma 12 in [9], we still
have
Pr[
∑
j
bij(v−i) ≥ ei(v−i)] ≥ 1
2
.
In the following, we use the revenue of mechanisms MEV BV CG andMEV IM to bound the Core.
To do so, first note that by the construction of mechanism MEV BV CG,
Rev(MEV BV CG(I)) = Rev(MBV CG(I;D′)).
Let V ′ij be the support of D′ij , V ′i = ×j∈MV ′ij , V ′ = ×i∈NV ′i . As before, given vi ∼ Di, denote by
v′i ∈ V ′i the value vector obtained by rounding vi down to the support of D′i. That is, each v′ij is
the largest value in V ′ij that is less than or equal to vij . Then,
Rev(MBV CG(I;D′)) ≥
∑
i
Ev−i∼D−iEvi∼DiRev(MBV CG(v′i, v−i;D′))
=
∑
i
Ev−i∼D−iEv′i∼D
′
i
Rev(MBV CG(v′i, v−i;D′)).
The inequality is because each player i can potentially buy item j only when j is in his winning set
(i.e., he is the highest bidder for j), and i’s winning set under v′i is a subset of his wining set under
vi. Moreover, the entry fee of i is the same under both (vi, v−i) and (v
′
i, v−i), as it only depends on
D′i and v−i. Thus the revenue inside the expectation does not increase when vi is replaced by v′i.
The equality is again because drawing vi from Di and then rounding down to v′i is equivalent to
drawing v′i from D′i directly.
Next, we lower-bound
∑
i Ev−i∼D−iEv′i∼D
′
i
Rev(MBV CG(v′i, v−i;D′)). As before, arbitrarily fixing
v−i and letting v
′
ij ∼ D′ij , define
b′ij(v−i) = (v
′
ij − βij(v−i))Iv′ij≥βij(v−i).
Note that b′ij(v−i) is a random variable that represents player i’s utility in the second price mecha-
nism on item j with value v′ij ∼ D′ij , when the other players’ bids are v−i,j. Also note that MBV CG
uses the optimal entry fee for each i with respect to v−i and D′, which generates expected revenue
from i (over D′i) greater than or equal to that by using the following entry fee,
e′i(v−i) =
ei(v−i)
1 + δ
.
Now we show player i accepts the entry fee e′i(v−i) with probability at least
1
2 . Indeed, for any vi
and the corresponding v′i,∑
j
b′ij(v−i) =
∑
j
(v′ij − βij(v−i))Iv′ij≥βij(v−i) ≥
∑
j
(
vij
1 + δ
− βij(v−i))I vij
1+δ
≥βij(v−i)
=
1
1 + δ
∑
j
(vij − (1 + δ)βij(v−i))Ivij≥(1+δ)βij (v−i) =
1
1 + δ
∑
j
bij(v−i).
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The inequality is because v′ij ≥ vij1+δ , and because
vij
1+δ ≥ βij(v−i) implies v′ij ≥ βij(v−i). Therefore
Pr
v′i∼D
′
i
[
∑
j
b′ij(v−i) ≥ e′i(v−i)] ≥ Pr
vi∼Di
[
1
1 + δ
∑
j
bij(v−i) ≥ ei(v−i)
1 + δ
]
= Pr
vi∼Di
[
∑
j
bij(v−i) ≥ ei(v−i)] ≥ 1
2
,
as desired. Thus we have
Rev(MEV BV CG(I))
≥
∑
i
Ev−i∼D−iEv′i∼D
′
i
Rev(MBV CG(v′i, v−i;D′))
≥ 1
2
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i) · ei(v−i)
1 + δ
=
1
2(1 + δ)
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
D−i(v−i)

∑
j
Evij∼Dij [cij(v−i)]− 2ri(v−i)


=
1
2(1 + δ)
Core− r
1 + δ
.
That is,
Core ≤ 2(1 + δ)Rev(MEV BV CG(I)) + 2r
≤ 2(1 + δ) [Rev(MEV BV CG(I)) +Rev(MEV IM (I))] . (17)
Combining Inequalities 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17,
OPT (I) ≤ (1 + δ)2 (2Rev(MEV BV CG(I)) + 6Rev(MEV IM (I)))
= (1 + ǫ) (2Rev(MEV BV CG(I)) + 6Rev(MEV IM (I))) .
Accordingly, by running mechanism MEV BV CG with probability 14 and mechanism MEV IM with
probability 34 , the expected revenue of mechanism MEV A is
Rev(MEV A(I)) ≥ 1
8(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I).
This finishes the proof of Theorem 4.
C Missing Proofs for Section 5
C.1 Single-Item Auctions
Lemma 2 (restated). Rev(MMRS(I ′)) ≥ 11+ǫOPT (I).
Proof. For each player i, denote the support of D′i by V ′i = (v′i;l)l∈{0,...,k}. We first define a way to
couple the values v′i ∼ D′i with the values vi ∼ Di.
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The randomized round-down scheme. For any value vi ≥ v′i;0, let v−i be vi rounded
down to the support of D′i, such that v−i is distributed according to D′i whenever vi is distributed
according to Di. Recall that under value queries, v−i is simply the largest value in V ′i that is less
than or equal to vi, no matter whether Di is continuous or discrete. Under quantile queries, when
Di is continuous, the same deterministic round-down scheme still works. However, the situation
is more subtle when Di is discrete, and we need a randomized round-down scheme to ensure the
relationship between vi and v
−
i . More precisely, by the definition of quantile queries, V
′
i is a subset
of Di’s support. If vi is not in V ′i , then it is still deterministically rounded down as before. If vi is
in V ′i , say vi = v
′
i;l, then by the definition of quantile queries and the construction of D′i, we have
Prx∼Di [x ≥ vi] ≥ ql = Prx∼D′i [x ≥ vi]. In this case, vi is rounded down to v′i;l−1 (i.e., v
−
i = v
′
i;l−1)
with probability
Prx∼Di [x ≥ vi]− Prx∼D′i [x ≥ vi]
Di(vi) ,
and to v′i;l (i.e., v
−
i = v
′
i;l) with probability
1− Prx∼Di [x ≥ vi]− Prx∼D
′
i
[x ≥ vi]
Di(vi) .
Following this scheme, it is not hard to verify that Prvi∼Di [v
−
i ≥ v′i;l] = ql for any l ∈ {0, . . . , k},
thus v−i is distributed according to D′i, as desired.
No matter what v−i is, let v
+
i be the smallest value in V
′
i that is strictly larger than v
−
i (if no
such value exists, then v+i = +∞). That is, v+i ≥ vi and v+i is vi “rounded up”, which was not
needed under value queries and is new for quantile queries.
The randomized resampling scheme. For any value v′i ∼ D′i, let vi be resampled from Di
conditional on “vi rounded down to v
′
i”, so that vi is distributed according to Di whenever v′i is
distributed according to D′i. Again, under value queries, the resampling is simply conditional on
vi ∈ [v′i;l, v′i;l+1) when v′i = v′i;l, no matter whether Di is continuous or discrete. Under quantile
queries, this resampling scheme still works when Di is continuous. When Di is discrete, we need to
“undo” the randomized round-down scheme defined above. More precisely, letting v′i = v
′
i;l, vi is set
to be v′i;l+1 with probability
p1 =
Prx∼Di[x ≥ v′i;l+1]− ql+1
D′i(v′i;l)
;
is resampled from Di conditional on vi ∈ (v′i;l, v′i;l+1) with probability
p2 =
Prx∼Di [v
′
i;l < x < v
′
i;l+1]
D′i(v′i;l)
;
and is set to be v′i;l with probability
p3 =
Prx∼Di [x ≤ v′i;l]− Prx∼D′i [x < v′i;l]
D′i(v′i;l)
=
Di(v′i;l)− Prx∼Di [x ≥ v′i;l] + ql
D′i(v′i;l)
.
Following this resampling scheme, it is not hard to verify that vi is distributed according to Di
whenever v′i is distributed according to D′i.
Given the round-down and the resampling schemes above, we consider the Bayesian mecha-
nism M∗ defined in Mechanism 9 for I ′, and compare its revenue with that of MMRS . We first
claim that M∗ is a DSIC mechanism, and prove it after the proof of Lemma 2.
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Mechanism 9 A Bayesian mechanism M∗ for instance I ′
1: Each player i reports his value v′i, and the mechanism discards the report that is not in V
′
i .
2: For each player i, generate value vi according to v
′
i using our resampling scheme.
3: Run MMRS with the value profile v and the prior distribution D, to get the price pi and the
allocation xi ∈ {0, 1} for each player i.
4: If xi = 1 and pi ≤ v′i, sell the item to i and charge him pi; otherwise, set xi = 0 and pi = 0.
Claim 1. M∗ is DSIC.
To analyze the revenue ofM∗, note that by construction, when v′i is distributed according to D′i,
the resampled vi inM∗ is distributed according to Di. Moreover, each v′i is distributed as if we first
sample vi from Di and then setting v′i = v−i .
Thus, mechanism M∗ on instance I ′ essentially generates the same expected revenue as MMRS
on instance I , except for the case when v′i < pi ≤ vi for the winner i. Fortunately, we are able to
upper-bound the probability of this event and thus upper-bound the expected revenue loss. More
precisely, for each player i, we write pi as pi(v−i;D) to emphasize that it is the threshold payment
for i given v−i and D, and does not depend on vi or v′i. We have
Rev(M∗(I ′)) =
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
pi(v−i;D)Iv−i ≥pi(v−i;D)
=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
pi(v−i;D) · Pr
vi∼Di
[v−i ≥ pi(v−i;D)]. (18)
Here the first equality holds because of the relationship between D′ and D as established by our
rounding and resampling schemes, and because each player i in M∗ pays the same threshold price
as in mechanism MMRS whenever v′i is at least the threshold, and pays 0 otherwise. By the
construction of the distribution D′, we have the following claim, with proof provided after the proof
of Lemma 2.
Claim 2. Prvi∼Di [vi ≥ pi(v−i;D)|qi(vi) > ǫ1] ≤ (1 + δ) Prvi∼Di [v−i ≥ pi(v−i;D)].
Combining Equation 18, Claim 2 and Small Tail Assumption 2, we are able to lower-bound the
revenue of M∗ as follows, which is also proved after the proof of Lemma 2.
Claim 3. Rev(M∗(I ′)) ≥ 11+ǫOPT (I).
By the optimality of MMRS , Rev(MMRS(I ′)) ≥ Rev(M∗(I ′)), and Lemma 2 holds.
We now prove the claims used above.
Claim 1 (restated). M∗ is DSIC.
Proof. Because MMRS is DSIC, each xi is monotone in vi. Although vi is a random variable
given v′i, it is easy to see that for any two different values v
′
i ∈ V ′i and vˆ′i ∈ V ′i , the corresponding
resampled values vi and vˆi are such that v
′
i < vˆ
′
i implies vi ≤ vˆi. Thus xi is monotone in v′i as well.
Moreover, let θi be player i’s threshold payment in MMRS given v−i and D. If v′i > θi then vi > θi,
thus player i gets the item at price pi = θi. If v
′
i < θi then player i does not get the item and pi = 0,
no matter whether vi < θi or not. Accordingly, θi is also player i’s threshold payment in M∗ under
v−i and D′. Since v−i does not depend on v′i, M∗ is DSIC as desired.
Claim 2 (restated). Prvi∼Di [vi ≥ pi(v−i;D)|qi(vi) > ǫ1] ≤ (1 + δ) Prvi∼Di [v−i ≥ pi(v−i;D)].
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Proof. By definition, qi(vi) > ǫ1 implies vi ≤ v′i;k, where v′i;k is the largest value in V ′i , the support
of distribution D′i. Note that v−i ≤ v′i;k for any vi. If pi(v−i;D) > v′i;k, then both probabilities are 0
and the inequality holds.
Below we consider the case pi(v−i;D) ≤ v′i;k. Let v′i;−1 = −1 and l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} be such that
v′i;l ≥ pi(v−i;D) and v′i;l−1 < pi(v−i;D). We have
Pr
vi∼Di
[vi ≥ pi(v−i;D)|qi(vi) > ǫ1]
≤ Pr
vi∼Di
[v+i ≥ pi(v−i;D)|qi(vi) > ǫ1]
= Pr
vi∼Di
[v+i ≥ v′i;l|qi(vi) > ǫ1]
= Pr
vi∼Di
[v−i ≥ v′i;l−1|qi(vi) > ǫ1]
= Pr
vi∼Di
[v−i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1}|qi(vi) > ǫ1]
=
Prvi∼Di[v
−
i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1} and qi(vi) > ǫ1]
Prvi∼Di [qi(vi) > ǫ1]
=
Prvi∼Di[v
−
i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1}]− Prvi∼Di[v−i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1} and qi(vi) ≤ ǫ1]
Prvi∼Di [qi(vi) > ǫ1]
=
Prvi∼Di[v
−
i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1}]− Prvi∼Di[qi(vi) ≤ ǫ1]
Prvi∼Di[qi(vi) > ǫ1]
≤ Pr
vi∼Di
[v−i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1}]
= Pr
v′i∼D
′
i
[v′i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1}] = qmax{0,l−1} ≤ (1 + δ)ql
= (1 + δ) Pr
v′i∼D
′
i
[v′i ≥ v′i;l] = (1 + δ) Pr
v′i∼D
′
i
[v′i ≥ pi(v−i;D)]
= (1 + δ) Pr
vi∼Di
[v−i ≥ pi(v−i;D)],
as desired. Indeed, the first inequality is because v+i > vi, and the first equality is because v
+
i ∈
V ′i ∪{+∞} and thus v+i ≥ pi(v−i;D) if and only if v+i ≥ v′i;l. Similarly, the second equality is because
(v−i , v
+
i ) and (v
′
i;l−1, v
′
i;l) are two pairs of consecutive values in V
′
i ∪ {−1,+∞}, thus v+i ≥ v′i;l if
and only if v−i ≥ v′i;l−1. The third equality is because v−i ≥ v′i;0 always. The sixth equality is
because qi(vi) ≤ ǫ1 implies vi ≥ v′i;k ≥ v′i;l, thus v−i ≥ v′i;max{0,l−1}. The seventh equality is by the
definition of the round-down scheme. The following two equalities and the inequality are by the
construction of D′i and the definition of the quantile vector q. Indeed, (1 + δ)q0 = 1 + δ > 1 = q0,
(1+ δ)q1 = ǫ1(1 + δ)
k ≥ ǫ1(1 + δ)log1+δ
1
ǫ1 = ǫ1 · 1ǫ1 = 1 = q0, and (1 + δ)ql = ql−1 for any l ≥ 2. The
second-last equality is because v′i ∈ V ′i , thus v′i ≥ v′i;l if and only if v′i ≥ pi(v−i;D). Finally, the last
equality is again by the definition of the round-down scheme.
Claim 3 (restated). Rev(M∗(I ′)) ≥ 11+ǫOPT (I).
Proof. Combining Equation 18 and Claim 2, we have
Rev(M∗(I ′)) ≥ 1
1 + δ
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
pi(v−i;D) · Pr
vi∼Di
[vi ≥ pi(v−i;D)|qi(vi) > ǫ1].
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Accordingly,
Rev(M∗(I ′)) ≥ 1
1 + δ
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
pi(v−i;D) · Pr
vi∼Di
[vi ≥ pi(v−i;D)|qi(vi) > ǫ1]
≥ 1
1 + δ
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
pi(v−i;D) · Pr
vi∼Di
[qi(vi) > ǫ1 and vi ≥ pi(v−i;D)]
=
1
1 + δ
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
pi(v−i;D) · Iqi(vi)>ǫ1 · Ivi≥pi(v−i;D)
=
1
1 + δ
E
v∼D
∑
i
pi(v−i;D) · Iqi(vi)>ǫ1 · Ivi≥pi(v−i;D)
≥ 1
1 + δ
E
v∼D
I∀i,qi(vi)>ǫ1 ·
∑
i
pi(v−i;D)Ivi≥pi(v−i;D)
=
1
1 + δ
E
v∼D
I∀i,qi(vi)>ǫ1 · RevOPT (v;I)
≥ 1− δ1
1 + δ
OPT (I). (19)
Here the second last equality holds by the definition of pi(v−i;D) and RevOPT (v;I), and last
inequality holds by the Small-Tail Assumption 2. Since δ = ǫ3 and δ1 =
2ǫ
3(1+ǫ) , we have
1− δ1
1 + δ
=
1
1 + ǫ
,
thus Claim 3 holds.
C.2 Additive Auctions
Before proving Theorem 7, we first analyze mechanism MEQBV CG, and we have the following.
Lemma 4. ∀ǫ > 0, for any additive Bayesian instance I = (N,M,D) satisfying Small-Tail As-
sumption 1, MEQBV CG is DSIC, has query complexity O(−m2n log1+ ǫ
5
h( ǫ10(1+ǫ) )), and
Rev(MEQBV CG(I)) ≥ 1
1 + ǫ5
(
Rev(MBV CG(I))− ǫ
10(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I)
)
.
Proof. First, mechanism MEQBV CG is DSIC because MBV CG is DSIC. The query complexity is
also immediate.
We now focus on the revenue of this mechanism. We explicitly writeMBV CG(I;D′) to emphasize
the fact that the seller runs mechanism MBV CG on the true valuation profile v ∼ D, but uses D′
to compute the entry fees ei. Given a player i and a valuation profile v, pi(vi,Di, v−i) is the price
for i under Di: that is,
pi(vi,Di, v−i) = I∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)(e(Di, v−i) +
∑
j
βijIvij≥βij),
where we omit v−i in βij(v−i) when v−i is clear from the context.
2 The price pi(vi,D′i, v−i) is
similarly defined. By the definition of the mechanism, we have
2If there are ties in the players’ values, then we distinguish between β+ij and β
−
ij , depending on the identity of the
player with the highest bid for j in N \ {i}.
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Rev(MEQBV CG(I)) = Rev(MBV CG(I;D′)) =
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
pi(vi,D′i, v−i). (20)
Next, let V ′ij be the support of D′ij , V ′i = ×j∈MV ′ij , round vi down to the closest valuation
v′i in V
′
i and compare the two valuation profiles (v
′
i, v−i) and (vi, v−i). By definition, v
′
ij ≥ βij
implies vij ≥ βij . Moreover, the entry fee of i is the same under both valuation profiles, as it
only depends on D′i and v−i. Similarly, the reserve price βij is the same for any item j. Thus
we have e(D′i, v−i) +
∑
j βijIvij≥βij ≥ e(D′i, v−i) +
∑
j βijIv′ij≥βij and I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i) ≥
I∑
j:vij≥βij
(v′ij−βij)≥e(D
′
i,v−i)
. Therefore
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
pi(vi,D′i, v−i) ≥ E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
pi(v
′
i,D′i, v−i) = E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
pi(v
′
i,D′i, v−i), (21)
where the equality is again because drawing vi from Di and then rounding down to v′i is equivalent
to drawing v′i from D′i directly.
In mechanism MBV CG, given v−i and D′i, e(D′i, v−i) is the optimal entry fee for maximizing the
expected revenue generated from i, where the expectation is taken over D′i. Accordingly,
E
v′i∼D
′
i
pi(v
′
i,D′i, v−i) ≥ E
v′i∼D
′
i
pi(v
′
i,Di, v−i). (22)
Combining Equations 20, 21 and 22, we have
Rev(MEQBV CG(I)) ≥
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
pi(v
′
i,Di, v−i). (23)
Thus we will use
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
pi(v
′
i,Di, v−i) to upper-bound Rev(MBV CG(I)).
To do so, first, for any player i, item j and value vij , if vij < v
′
ij;k where v
′
ij;k is the largest
value in V ′ij, then denote by vij the smallest value in V
′
ij that is strictly larger than vij; otherwise,
let vij = vij . Moreover, denote by vij the largest value in V
′
ij that is weakly smaller than vij. The
valuation vi and vi are defined correspondingly given vi. Then We have
Rev(MBV CG(I)) =
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
pi(vi,Di, v−i)
=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I∀j,qij(vij)>ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


+
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I∃j,qij(vij)≤ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij

 .
(24)
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Below we upper-bound the last two lines in Equation 24 separately. For the first part, we have
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I∀j,qij(vij )>ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


≤
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I∀j,qij(vij )>ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


=
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
∑
ui∈V ′i :
∑
j:uij≥βij
(uij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)
Pr
vi∼Di
[vi = ui]

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIuij≥βij

 .
(25)
The inequality above is because vij ≤ vij for each player i and item j, which implies
I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i) ≤ I∑j:vij≥βij (vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i) and
∑
j βijIvij≥βij ≤
∑
j βijIvij≥βij .
Next, by the definition of the quantile vector q, for any uij ∈ V ′ij we have
Pr
vij∼Dij
[vij = uij] ≤ (1 + δ) Pr
vij∼Dij
[vij = uij].
Indeed, when uij = v
′
ij;0, Pr[vij < uij] = 0 < (1 + δ)(1 − ǫ1(1 + δ)k−1) = (1 + δ)(q0 − q1) =
(1 + δ) Pr[vij ∈ [v′ij;0, v′ij;1)]. When uij = v′ij;l with 0 < l < k, Pr(vij ∈ [v′ij;l−1, v′ij;l)) = ql−1 − ql ≤
(1+ δ)ql− ql = δql = (1+ δ)δql+1 = (1+ δ)((1+ δ)ql+1− ql+1) = (1+ δ)(ql− ql+1) = (1+ δ) Pr[vij ∈
[v′ij;l, v
′
ij;l+1)]. And when uij = v
′
ij;k, Pr[vij ∈ [v′ij;k−1, v′ij;k]] = qk−1−qk = δǫ1 < ǫ1 = Pr[vij ≥ v′ij;k].
Since all distributions are independent, for any ui ∈ V ′i we have
Pr
vi∼Di
[vi = ui] ≤ (1 + δ)m Pr
vi∼Di
[vi = ui]. (26)
Combining Equations 25 and 26, we have
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I∀j,qij(vij)>ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


≤
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
∑
ui∈V ′i :
∑
j:uij≥βij
(uij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)
(1 + δ)m · Pr
vi∼Di
[vi = ui] ·

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIuij≥βij


= (1 + δ)m
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
I∑
j:v′
ij
≥βij
(v′ij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIv′ij≥βij


= (1 + δ)m
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
v′i∼D
′
i
pi(v
′
i,Di, v−i) ≤ (1 + δ)mRev(MECBV CG(Iˆ)). (27)
The first equality above holds because drawing vi from Di and rounding down to the support of D′i
is equivalent to drawing v′i from D′i. The second equality is by the definition of pi(v′i,Di, v−i), and
the last inequality holds by Equation 23.
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By Equations 24 and 27, we have
Rev(MBV CG(I))
≤ (1 + δ)mRev(MEQBV CG(I))
+
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I∃j,qij(vij )≤ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij

 .
(28)
For the last line of Equation 28, we have
∑
i
E
v−i∼D−i
E
vi∼Di
I∃j,qij(vij)≤ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


= E
v∼D
∑
i
I∃j,qij(vij )≤ǫ1I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


≤ E
v∼D
I∃i,j,qij(vij )≤ǫ1
∑
i
I
∑
j:vij≥βij
(vij−βij)≥e(Di,v−i)

e(Di, v−i) +∑
j
βijIvij≥βij


= E
v∼D
I∃i,j,qij(vij )≤ǫ1Rev(MBV CG(v;I)) ≤
ǫ
10(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I). (29)
The first inequality above is because, for each player i and valuation profile v, I∃j,qij(vij)≤ǫ1 ≤
I∃i,j,qij(vij)≤ǫ1 . The second inequality is by the Small-Tail Assumption 1.
Combining Equations 28 and 29, we have
Rev(MBV CG(I)) ≤ (1 + δ)mRev(MEQBV CG(I)) + ǫ
10(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I).
By the construction of Mechanism 8, (1 + δ)m = 1 + ǫ5 . Therefore Lemma 4 holds.
Theorem 7 (restated). ∀ǫ > 0, any additive Bayesian instance I = (N,M,D) satisfying Small-Tail
Assumption 1, MEQA is DSIC, has query complexity O(−m2n log1+ ǫ
5
h( ǫ10(1+ǫ))), and
Rev(MEQA(I)) ≥ 1
8(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I).
Proof. First, as bothMEQBV CG andMEQIM are DSIC,MEQA is DSIC. Second, note thatMEQA
runs both mechanisms with δ = (1 + ǫ5 )
1/m − 1 and ǫ1 = h( ǫ10(1+ǫ)). To ease the analysis, when
running mechanism MEQIM , let δ = ǫ15 and ǫ1 = h( 2ǫ3(5+ǫ) ): that is, set ǫ′ = ǫ5 and run mechanism
MEQM with parameter ǫ′ for each item. By Theorem 5, with O(−mn log1+ ǫ
15
h( 2ǫ3(5+ǫ) )) queries,
Rev(MEQIM (I)) ≥ 1
1 + ǫ5
Rev(MIM (I)).
By Lemma 4, with O(−m2n log1+ ǫ
5
h( ǫ10(1+ǫ) )) queries,
Rev(MEQBV CG(I)) ≥ 1
1 + ǫ5
(
Rev(MBV CG(I))− ǫ
10(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I)
)
.
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Note that the total query complexity is still O(−m2n log1+ ǫ
5
h( ǫ10(1+ǫ) )).
Let mechanism MEQA run MEQBV CG with probability 14 and MEQIM with probability 34 . We
have
Rev(MEQA(I)) = 1
4
Rev(MEQBV CG(I)) + 3
4
Rev(MEQIM (I))
≥ 1
4(1 + ǫ5)
(
Rev(MBV CG(I))− ǫ
10(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I)
)
+
3
4(1 + ǫ5)
Rev(MIM (I))
≥ 1
1 + ǫ5
(
1
4
Rev(MBV CG(I)) + 3
4
Rev(MIM (I))− ǫ
10(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I)
)
≥ 1
1 + ǫ5
(
1
8
OPT (I)− ǫ
10(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I)
)
=
1
8(1 + ǫ)
OPT (I).
The last inequality above holds because 2MBV CG(I) + 6MIM (I) ≥ OPT (I) [9]. Thus Theo-
rem 7 holds.
C.3 The Proof for Corollary 1
Corollary 1 (restated). For any ǫ > 0, H > 1, and prior distribution D with each Dij bounded
within [1,H], there exist DSIC mechanisms that use O(mn log1+ǫ
nmH(1+ǫ)
ǫ ) quantile queries for
single-item auctions and unit-demand auctions, and use O(m2n log1+ǫ
nmH(1+ǫ)
ǫ ) quantile queries
for additive auctions, whose approximation ratios for OPT are respectively 1 + ǫ, 24(1 + ǫ) and
8(1 + ǫ).
Proof. We only need to show that the Small-Tail Assumptions 1 and 2 are naturally satisfied when
the distributions have bounded supports. For example, consider additive auctions where all values
are in [1,H], as considered in [28, 15]. Then mH and 1 are straightforward upper- and lower-
bounds for OPT (I), respectively. Moreover, by individual rationality, mH is an upper-bound for
the revenue generated under any valuation profiles. Given δ1, let ǫ1 = h(δ1) =
δ1
m2nH and denote by
E the event that there exist at least one player i and one item j with qij(vij) ≤ ǫ1. By the union
bound, Pr[E] ≤ mnǫ1 = mn · δ1m2nH = δ1mH . Therefore
E
v∼D
I∃i,j,qij(vij)≤ǫ1Rev(M(v;I)) ≤ mH · Pr[E] ≤ δ1 ≤ δ1OPT (I).
Combining this observation with Theorems 5, 6 and 7, we have Corollary 1 when the values are all
bounded in [1,H].
D Missing Proofs for Section 6
D.1 Lower Bound
We only prove Theorem 8 for the single-player case, as in the following lemma. The lower bound for
general multi-player single-item auctions can be proved using the same technique as in Theorem 1,
thus the full proof has been omitted.
Lemma 5. For any constant ǫ ∈ (0, 164), there exists a constant C such that, for any DSIC Bayesian
mechanism M making less than C/ǫ non-adaptive value and quantile queries to the oracle, there
exists a single-player single-item Bayesian auction instance I = (N,M,D) where D is regular, such
that Rev(M(I)) < OPT (I)1+ǫ .
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Proof. Since the distributions are unbounded, we can always construct the distributions such that for
any finite number of value queries, the responses for the value queries have almost none contribution
to the optimal revenue. Thus we only need to focus on the lower bound for quantile queries.
Letting k , ⌈ 1δǫ⌉ and C , 1−2δǫ2δ . Here δ is a constant to be determined later and δ, ǫ satisfies
that k ≥ 2. In our construction, we divide the quantile interval [0, 1] into k + 1 sub-intervals each,
with the right-end points defined as follows: from left to right, q0 = 0, qt+1 = qt + δǫ for each
t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Accordingly, for any Bayesian mechanism M that makes less than Cǫ non-adaptive quantile
queries, there exists a quantile interval (qt, qt+1) such that, qt+1 ≤ 1 − 2δǫ and with probability at
least 12 , no quantile in (qt, qt+1) is queried. Indeed, if this is not the case, then with probability at
least 12 , all the quantile intervals except (1 − 2δǫ, 1 − δǫ) and (1 − δǫ, 1) are queried. Since there
are at least k − 2 quantile intervals, the expected total number of queries made by M is at least
k
2 − 1 ≥ 1−2δǫ2δǫ = Cǫ , a contradiction.
We now construct two different single-player single-item Bayesian instances
{Iz = (N,M,Dz)}z∈{1,2},
where the distributions outside the quantile range (qt, qt+1) are all the same. Thus with probability
at least 12 , mechanism M cannot distinguish the Iz’s from each other. We then show that when
this happens, mechanism M cannot be a (1 + 3ǫ)-approximation for all instances Iz.
Let R be a parameter that is large enough such that no value query will get any useful response.
Then the first distribution D1 with value bounded within [0, Rqt ] is defined as follows, where F1(·) is
the cumulative probability function of D1.
F1(v) =
{
1− R(1−qt+1)v+R , 0 ≤ v < Rqt ,
1, v = Rqt .
That is there is a probability mass qt1−δǫ at value
R
qt
and within interval [0, Rqt ) it is a continuous
distribution. Then for any quantile in range (0, qt1−δǫ ], the oracle will response
R
qt
. For quantile q in
range ( qt1−δǫ , 1], the oracle will response v(q) =
R
1−qt+1
(1q − 1). Therefore the revenue function with
related to the quantile q is
R1(q) =
{
R
1−qt+1
(1− q), qt1−δǫ < q ≤ 1,
R
1−δǫ , q =
qt
1−δǫ .
The revenue curve R1(q) is illustrated figure 2.
The second distribution D2 with value bounded within [0, Rqt ] is defined as follows, where F2(·)
is the cumulative probability function of D2. Let v∗ = R(2−δǫ)2(1−δǫ)−(2−δǫ)(1−qt+1) . Since qt+1 ≤ 1 − 2δǫ,
v∗ > 0 is well defined and it is easy to check v∗ < Rqt .
F2(v) =


1− R(1−qt+1)v+R , 0 ≤ v < v∗,
1− R(1−δǫ)(1+qt−δǫ)v−R , v∗ ≤ v < Rqt ,
1, v = Rqt .
That is, there is a probability mass qt at value
R
qt
and a two-step continuous distribution within
[qt, q
∗] and [q∗, qt+1]. Thus for any quantile in range (0, qt], the oracle will response
R
qt
. It can be
calculated that the quantile of value v∗ is q∗ = 1− 2−δǫ2(1−δǫ) · (1− qt+1). Then for quantile q in range
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Figure 2: The revenue curve of D1.
(qt, q
∗], the oracle will response v(q) = Rq (1 − qt1+qt−δǫ) + R1+qt−δǫ . For quantile q in range (q∗, 1],
the oracle will response v(q) = R1−qt+1 (
1
q − 1). Therefore the revenue function with related to the
quantile q is
R2(q) =


R
1−qt+1
(1− q), q∗ < q ≤ 1,
R
1+qt−δǫ
(1 + q − δǫ), qt ≤ q < q∗,
R, q = qt.
The revenue curve R2(q) is illustrated figure 3.
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Figure 3: The revenue curve of D2.
Indeed when the quantile query is from [0, qt]∪ [qt+1, 1], the oracle’s answers for all distributions
are the same. Accordingly, with probability at least 12 , mechanism M cannot distinguish Dz’s from
each other, which means it cannot distinguish Iz’s from each other, as desired.
Since M is truthful, the allocation rule for the player must be monotone and he will pay the
threshold payment set by M, denoted by P . Let P ∗ = (4−δǫ)R4(1−δǫ)−(4−δǫ)(1−qt+1) . Here P may be
randomized. Recall that OPT (I1) = R1−δǫ . If with probability 12 setting the price P ≤ P ∗, then for
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instance I1, we have
Rev(M(I1)) ≤ 1
2
OPT (I1) + 1
2
(
3R
4(1 − δǫ) +
R
4
)
=
7R
8(1 − δǫ) +
R
8
=
R
1− δǫ
(
1− 1
8
δǫ
)
<
OPT (I1)
1 + 4ǫ
when δ ≥ 32. On the other hand, recall that OPT (I2) = R2(1−δǫ) + R2 = (2−δǫ)R2(1−δǫ) . If with probability
1
2 , the price P > P
∗, for instance I2, we have
Rev(M(I2)) < 1
2
OPT (I2) + (4− δǫ)R
2(4− 2δǫ) =
(2− δǫ)R
4(1 − δǫ) +
(4− δǫ)R
2(4− 2δǫ)
=
(2− δǫ)R
2(1 − δǫ)
(
1
2
+
(4− δǫ)(1− δǫ)
2(2− δǫ)2
)
= OPT (I2)
(
1− δǫ
2(2 − δǫ)2
)
<
OPT (I2)
1 + 4ǫ
when δ ≥ 32. Thus for any mechanism M with O(1ǫ ) quantile queries, there exists z∗ ∈ {0, 1} such
that when ǫ < 164 and δ = 32,
Rev(M(Iz∗)) ≤ OPT (Iz
∗)
2
+
OPT (Iz∗)
2(1 + 4ǫ)
<
OPT (Iz∗)
1 + ǫ
.
Therefore Lemma 5 holds.
D.2 Upper Bound
Mechanism 10 Efficient quantile Myerson mechanism for regular distributions, MEMR
1: Given ǫ > 0, run algorithm AQ with δ = ǫ4 and ǫ1 = ǫ
2
256n for each player i’s distribution Di,
with the returned distribution denoted by D′i. Let D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
2: RunMMRS with D′ and the players’ reported values, b = (bi)i∈N , to get allocation x = (xi)i∈N
and price profile p = (pi)i∈N as the outcome.
Theorem 9. (restated) ∀ǫ ∈ (0, 1), for any single-item instance I = (N,M,D) where D is regular,
mechanism MEMR is DSIC, has query complexity O(n log1+ǫ nǫ ), and Rev(MEMR(I)) ≥ OPT (I)1+ǫ .
Proof. Consider the quantile value q∗ = ǫ
2
256n and v
∗
i = F
−1
i (1 − q∗). Let vˆi = max{v∗i , 16OPT (I)ǫ },
and D¯1, . . . , D¯n be imaginary distributions obtained by truncating D1, . . . ,Dn at vˆi (i.e., a sample
v¯i from D¯i is obtained by first sampling vi from Di and then rounding down to v¯i = min{vi, vˆi}).
Finally, denote by I¯ = (N,M, D¯) the imaginary Bayesian instance where players’ values are drawn
from D¯.
Note that D′ is also a discretization distribution for D¯, following the proof and notations of
Theorem 5, letting v−i be the value first sampled from D¯i then rounding down to the support of D′,
we have MEMR is truthful and using the technique of Mechanism 9, we have
Rev(MEMR(I)) = Rev(MMRS(v,D′)) ≥ Rev(MMRS(v′,D′))
≥
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v−i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)]
=
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v−i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · (Iv∗i≤ 16OPT (I)ǫ + Iv∗i> 16OPT (I)ǫ ). (30)
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We bound the indicators separately.
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v−i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · Iv∗i≤ 16OPT (I)ǫ
=
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v−i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)]
·I
v∗i ≤
16OPT (I)
ǫ
· (Ipi(v¯−i;D¯)<v∗i + Ipi(v¯−i;D¯)≥v∗i )
≥
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
[pi(v¯−i; D¯) · 1
1 + ǫ4
· Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · Iv∗i≤ 16OPT (I)ǫ · Ipi(v¯−i;D¯)<v∗i
+(pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)]− 16OPT (I)
ǫ
· ǫ
2
256n
) · I
v∗i≤
16OPT (I)
ǫ
· Ipi(v¯−i;D¯)≥v∗i ]
≥ 1
1 + ǫ4
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · Iv∗i ≤OPT (I)16ǫ −
ǫ
16
·OPT (I). (31)
The first inequality here holds because for price pi(v¯−i; D¯) < v∗i , we have
Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v−i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] ≥
1
1 + ǫ4
Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)]
due to the structure of the quantile queries for D′. For price pi(v¯−i; D¯) ≥ v∗i , when v∗i ≤ 16OPT (I)ǫ ,
by the regularity of Di, the optimal reserve corresponds to the quantile interval ( ǫ2256n , 1]. Thus we
have
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v−i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] ≥ 0
≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)]− v∗i · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ v∗i ]
≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)]− 16OPT (I)
ǫ
· ǫ
2
256n
since the expected revenue is non-decreasing for quantile range [0, ǫ
2
256n ]. Thus Equation 31 holds.
Then for the second indicator for Equation 30, we have
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v−i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · Iv∗i> 16OPT (I)ǫ
≥ 1
1 + ǫ4
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · Iv∗i> 16OPT (I)ǫ (32)
also by the construction the quantile queries for D′. Combining Equation 30, 31 and 32, we have
Rev(MEMR(I))
≥ 1
1 + ǫ4
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · Iv∗i≤ 16OPT (I)ǫ −
ǫ
16
· OPT (I)
+
1
1 + ǫ4
∑
i
E
v¯−i∼D¯−i
pi(v¯−i; D¯) · Pr
v¯i∼D¯i
[v¯i ≥ pi(v¯−i; D¯)] · Iv∗i> 16OPT (I)ǫ
=
1
1 + ǫ4
Rev(MMRS(v¯, D¯))− ǫ
16
·OPT (I)
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By Lemma 2 of [18], for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, Rev(MMRS(v¯, D¯)) = OPT (I¯) ≥ (1− ǫ4)OPT (I). Thus we
have
Rev(MEMR(I))
≥ 1
1 + ǫ4
(1− ǫ
4
)OPT (I)− ǫ
16
· OPT (I) ≥ 1
1 + ǫ
OPT (I).
Thus Theorem 9 holds.
E Applications: Sampling Mechanisms
Using our techniques for query complexity, we can easily construct sampling mechanisms for multi-
parameter auctions. Currently, the sample complexity for unit-demand auctions and additive dis-
tributions has been upper-bounded in [3, 30, 21, 6] for bounded auctions. In this section, we provide
another way to explicitly construct sampling mechanisms for both unit-demand and additive auc-
tions, for arbitrary distributions with small-tails (and for bounded distributions).
The idea is to use samples to approximate quantile queries. Mechanism 11 defines our sampling
mechanism MSM . Recall that mechanisms MMRS , MUD and MA are known (approximately)
optimal DSIC mechanisms for single-item, unit-demand and additive auctions respectively. Note
that in mechanism MSM , we use a different method to discretize the quantile space for additive
auctions, so as to further reduce its sample complexity. In particular, we have the following theorem.
Mechanism 11 Sampling Mechanism MSM
1: For single-item auctions and unit-demand auctions, given ǫ > 0, set δ = ǫ6 , ǫ1 = h(
2ǫ
3(1+ǫ) )
and k = ⌈log1+δ 1ǫ1 ⌉; define the quantile vector as q = (q0, q1, . . . , qk−1, qk) = (1, ǫ1(1 +
δ)k−1, . . . , ǫ1(1 + δ), ǫ1).
For additive auctions, given ǫ > 0, set ǫ1 = h(
ǫ
10(1+ǫ)) and k = ⌊ 1ǫ1 ⌋; define the quantile vector
as q = (q0, q1, . . . , qk−1, qk) = (1, kǫ1, . . . , 2ǫ1, ǫ1).
2: For each player i and item j, given t samples V tij = {v1ij , . . . , vtij}, without loss of generality
assume v1ij ≥ v2ij ≥ · · · ≥ vtij . For each quantile ql, set vtqlij to be the value corresponding to the
quantile query ql. (If tql is not an integer then the mechanism takes ⌈tql⌉.)
3: Construct a discrete distribution D′ij as follows: D′ij(vtqlij ) = ql− ql+1 for each l ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1},
and D′ij(vtqkij ) = ǫ1. Finally, let D′i = ×j∈MD′ij for each player i and let D′ = ×i∈ND′i.
4: Run MMRS/MUD/MA with distribution D′ and the players’ reported values.
Theorem 10. ∀ǫ > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1), for any Bayesian instance I = (N,M,D),
• for single-item auctions satisfying the Small-Tail Assumption 2, with O˜(h−2( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ)) · ( ǫ1+ǫ )−2)
samples, mechanismMSM achieves revenue at least 11+ǫOPT (I) with probability at least 1−γ;
• for unit-demand auctions satisfying the Small-Tail Assumption 2, with O˜(h−2( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ))·( ǫ1+ǫ )−2)
samples, mechanismMSM achieves revenue at least 124(1+ǫ)OPT with probability at least 1−γ;
• for additive auctions satisfying the Small-Tail Assumption 1, with O˜(h−2( ǫ10(1+ǫ))(12− 11+(1+ ǫ
5
)1/m
))−2)
samples, mechanism MSM achieves revenue at least 18(1+ǫ)OPT with probability at least 1−γ.
38
Proof. After constructing the distributions, we simply run the existing DSIC mechanisms as a
Blackbox, and if the constructed distribution satisfies the property that for any quantile ql,
qij(v
t·ql+1
ij ) ≥
1
1 + ǫ3
(
qij(v
t·ql
ij )
)
. (33)
all our query complexity results for single-item and unit-demand auctions directly apply here.
Since here for sampling mechanism, we slice the quantile interval uniformly, in the ideal case, the
selected sampled values correspond to the desired quantiles and Dij(vt·qlij ) = Dij(vt·ql+1ij ). However,
since these samples are random, we may not obtain the ideal case. In fact, given parameter d =
12+3ǫ
ǫ , if for any quantile ql,
ql − ql
d
≤ qij(vt·qlij ) ≤ ql +
ql
d
, (34)
then
qij(v
t·ql+1
ij )
qij(v
t·ql
ij )
≥ ql+1(1−
1
d)
ql(1 +
1
d)
≥
1
1+ ǫ
6
(1− 1d)
1 + 1d
=
1
1 + ǫ3
,
for any ǫ > 0, that is, Equantion 33 holds. In the following, we show how many samples are enough
to obtain Inequality 34.
First, we bound the probability that vt·qlij locates in the quantile interval [ql − qld , ql + qld ]. Let
Eleftij,l be the event that v
t·ql
ij locates in the quantile interval [0, ql − qld ], and Erightij,l be the event that
vt·qlij locates in the quantile interval [ql +
ql
d , 1]. Then
Pr[Eleftij,l ] =
t−t·ql∑
s=0
(
t
s
)(
ql − ql
d
)s (
1− ql + ql
d
)t−s
,
and
Pr[Erightij,l ] =
t·ql∑
s=0
(
t
s
)(
1− ql − ql
d
)s (
ql +
ql
d
)t−s
.
By Chernoff’s inequality and ∀i, j, l, letting Pr[Eleftij,l ] and Pr[Erightij,l ] be no more than γ2mn(k+1) ,
t = O˜(( ǫ1d )
−2) = O˜(( ǫ·ǫ1(1+ǫ))
−2). That is with O˜(h−2( 2ǫ3(1+ǫ) ) · ( ǫ1+ǫ)−2) samples, the probability that
vt·qlij does not locate in the quantile interval [ql − qld , ql + qld ] is less than γmn(k+1) . By union bound,
there exists one vt·qlij for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], l ∈ [k + 1] does not locate in the quantile interval
[ql − qld , ql + qld ] is less than γ. Then with probability 1− γ, Inequality 34 holds.
For additive auctions, if the constructed distribution satisfies the property that for any quan-
tile ql,
qij(v
t·ql
ij )− qij(vt·ql+1ij ) ≥
1
(1 + ǫ5)
1/m
(
qij(v
t·ql+1
ij )− qij(vt·ql+2ij )
)
, (35)
all our query complexity results for additive auctions directly apply here. In fact, if for any quan-
tile ql,
ql − ǫ1(1
2
− 1
1 + (1 + ǫ5)
1/m
) ≤ qij(vt·qlij ) ≤ ql + ǫ1(
1
2
− 1
1 + (1 + ǫ5)
1/m
),
then,
qij(v
t·ql
ij )− qij(vt·ql+1ij )
qij(v
t·ql+q
ij )− qij(vt·ql+2ij )
≥
ǫ1 − ǫ1(1− 21+(1+ ǫ
5
)1/m
)
ǫ1 + ǫ1(1− 21+(1+ ǫ
5
)1/m
)
=
1
(1 + ǫ5)
1/m
,
Using the same technique of applying the Chernoff’s inequality, with O˜(h−2( ǫ10(1+ǫ))(
1
2− 11+(1+ ǫ
5
)1/m
))−2)
samples, Equation 35 holds with probability 1− γ. Thus Theorem 10 holds.
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Remark. Following the convention in the literature, a logarithmic factor depending on γ has
been absorbed in O˜(·). If the values are bounded in [1,H], by defining the tail function h according
to H, the resulting sample complexity is O˜(m4n2H2(1 + ǫ)4ǫ−4) for unit-demand auctions and
O˜(m4n2H2(1+ǫǫ )
2(12 − 11+(1+ ǫ
5
)1/m
))−2) for additive auctions.
We note that our resulting sampling mechanisms are not better than the best-known sample
complexity results as shown in Table 2. However, our mechanisms are able to deal with unbounded
distributions satisfy small-tail assumptions.
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